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Abstract 
This paper introduces a variation to the Role Based Access Control (RBAC) model called 
Impediment Sensitive RBAC (IS-RBAC) to be used for implantable and closely-worn medical 
devices.  The IS-RBAC represents impediments including instrument failures, user failures, and 
environmental situations.  IS-RBAC accommodates the impacts that the three types of 
impediments convey on two foundation set definitions, namely, the data set and the set of user 
role assignments.  With these new definitions, IS-RBAC model strengthens the weaknesses 
caused to the protection of data from user and instrument failures and environmental situations, 
mitigates threats from users with elevated user role privileges, and ultimately helps prevent 
potential harm to data owners. Implantable and closely worn medical devices (instruments) offer 
substantial examples to illustrate applicability of the IS-RBAC model.  This paper presents 
instrument and user failures and environmental situations associated with instrument Socio-
Technical Systems including a modern heart pacemaker, insulin pump, hearing aid, and several 
smartphone sensory applications.  
 
.   
 
  
1 Introduction 
Advances in technologies offer the medical community a multitude of new information 
sources, storage locations, and analytical opportunities to improve patient health care.  These 
same advances in technologies offer opportunities for additional conditions under which 
information may be accessed in an unauthorized, undesired, or unanticipated fashion.  Medical 
systems fail in a variety of ways under many circumstances.  Patients‘ biological states also 
present an even wider range of situations in which Personally Identifiable Information (PII) may 
be required by doctors, medical staff, emergency medical technicians, and even good Samaritans.  
Additionally, HIPAA [1] stipulates restrictive ―...standards and requirements for the electronic 
transmission of certain health information.‖    
In combination, the convergence (ubiquity) of technology, the failing states of computer 
instruments, the diverse information needs by an assortment of medical actors, and the 
environmental situations in which the systems and users must operate, offer a difficult 
environment to prepare a secure system.  While there are many solutions to protect the 
confidentiality and integrity of medical PII in relatively static computing environments, few 
research efforts address situations where distinct instrument and user failure states and 
environmental situations formally impede the application of different confidentiality directives. 
Some research efforts examine ―privacy-aware‖ Role-Based Access Controls (RBACs)[2] and 
―context constraints in RBAC environments.‖ [3] However, these research efforts consider 
RBACs based on the nature or ―purpose‖ [4] of the information. 
This thesis employs Summerville‘s [5] concept that computer technologies and their 
respective users interlock into a structure called a Socio-Technical System.  The contributions of 
this thesis include the following for Socio-Technical Systems: 
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1) Identify instrument and user failings and environmental situations as impediments to user 
role assignments and data availability in Socio-Technical Systems. 
2) Identify a taxonomy that classifies instrument failures and an internationally accepted 
taxonomy that classifies user failures. 
3) Develop a variation of the role-based access control (RBAC) model.  This new model, 
termed an Impediment Sensitive Role-Based Access Control (IS-RBAC), represents the 
sensitivities to data availability and user role assignments that instrument and user 
failures and environmental situations have on Socio-Technical Systems.  
4) Apply the IS-RBAC model to an example Socio-Technical System consisting of an 
insulin pump, web server, patient, PII, and a variety of additional user roles. 
This thesis is organized into 4 additional sections and a few appendices.  The next section 
presents background information about Socio-Technical Systems, few example Socio-Technical 
Systems found in the medical arena, an overview of failures and their impediment to Socio-
Technical Systems, and a review of RBAC models.  After the background section, the IS-RBAC 
model is introduced, defined, and illustrated from an example of a Socio-Technical System.  The 
latter two sections present conclusions and future work suggestions. 
  
  
2 Background 
This section begins with a review of systems, namely Technical Computer-Based 
Systems and Socio-Technical Systems.  The background continues with a discussion of medical 
instruments, their failures and for lack of a better term, user failures.  The medical instruments 
used are closely worn by or embedded in the patient.  Non-medical components such as a 
smartphone, desktop computer, and a web server, comprise the overall Socio-Technical System 
and work in conjunction with these medical instruments.  The failures in these Socio-Technical 
Systems are shown to impact access controls to, and at times, information.  Also presented are 
few medical environmental situations which also impact access controls.  The nature of the 
instruments discuss provides insights into the fashion in which the instrument and user failures 
and environmental situations affect access controls.  Lastly, this section presents a review of 
RBAC models. 
2.1 Systems 
Sommerville [5] describes two categories of software systems, namely, Technical 
Computer-Based Systems and Socio-Technical Systems.   
Technical Computer-Based Systems are systems that include hardware and software 
components but not procedures and processes.   
Socio-Technical Systems include one or more Technical Computer-Based Systems but, 
crucially, also include knowledge of how the system should be used to achieve some 
broader objective. 
Dewsbury[6]  describes the role of the user and surmises their impact on dependability of 
home based domestic systems.  This could not be any truer for instruments (the ultimate domestic 
systems) presented in this paper.   
Most dependability theory attempts to consider humans as elements in the system that are 
comparable with other software or hardware elements.  
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For domestic systems, the users of the system are central to the design and central to the 
consideration of dependability.  In the home, there are no defined operational processes, 
enormous variation in system users, and no ―quality control‖.  The dependability of home 
systems is played out daily through the routines and situated actions of the people in the 
home. 
Malicious attacks or inadvertent unauthorized access to PII can occur at many places in a 
Socio-Technical System.  For example, in systems which include a centralized database located at 
a company‘s facility, administration personnel at the facility may have physical access to data in 
an unauthorized fashion.  Likewise, in a system in which data traverses the Internet, unauthorized 
users may attack data at edge routers. 
Internet based systems allow PII to be shared in an unprotected fashion.  The information 
in the system can be shared with other outside systems via human interactions such as an email or 
a scan of hardcopy data.  Systems with wireless technologies such as Wi-Fi and Bluetooth may be 
subject to intercept, either nefariously or accidentally.  They are also subject to a denial of service 
if located in a noisy electromagnetic environment or if switched to Airplane mode as in the case 
of a smartphone on an airplane. 
Physical access to a user‘s smartphone may allow an actor to gain unauthorized access to 
PII.  Similarly, physical access to almost any computer server or workstation component of the 
system may yield the same unauthorized access. 
To summarize, Socio-Technical Systems inherit the same INFOSEC properties 
(Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability) as the individual Technical Computer-Based 
Systems which make up the total system.  The INFOSEC properties of system components not 
only include the hardware and software, but also include the INFOSEC properties associated with 
people (users, operators, technicians, administrators).   The access control model should take this 
in account by representing changes to data availability, user role assignments, and environmental 
situations of Socio-Technical Systems. 
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2.2 Instruments 
This section presents a variety of Socio-Technical Systems found in the medical arena.  
Each consists of Technical Computer-Based Systems and users.  At least one of the Technical 
Computer-Based Systems is a closely worn or implantable medical instrument.  A variety of 
technologies connect them to other elements in the Socio-Technical Systems including wireless 
networks, Bluetooth, or Internet.  Users include the patient, physician, and technical close support 
personnel. 
In order to provide brevity here, only three Socio-Technical Systems are presented in this 
section and the remaining are described in Appendix A.   
2.2.1 Insulin Pump 
The Medtronic Guardian REAL-time insulin pump [7] shown in Figure 1 offers advanced 
monitoring and infusion of insulin. 
 
Figure 1.  The Medtronic Guardian REAL-time insulin pump. 
This instrument can interface with personal computers for the user and physician via 
Medtronic‘s‘ CareLink software[8], either the personal or professional version.  The personal 
version of the software is described on the Medtronic [8] website as follows:  
CareLink™ Personal is software designed for Patients and is run via a website. This 
secure, online therapy management software downloads data from your pump to turn into 
reports, giving you superior insight into patterns of your diabetes and therapy. As long as 
you have a CareLink USB with you, you can download your pump data at home or 
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anywhere that you have Internet access. Just like a web email account, you just register 
and login. 
This system has several Technical Computer-Based Systems and users which interact 
together to compose a Socio-Technical System.  The Socio-Technical System includes the pump 
shown in Figure 1, the website (computer and software system) to which the user‘s data will be 
uploaded, and the CareLink™ Personal software with its components as listed below (per 
Medtronic‘s web site[9]). 
 Access to a computer running Windows® 98SE, ME, 2000, XP, or Vista 32 bit. 
 A reliable Internet connection  
 Microsoft® Internet Explorer version 5.5 or higher, Adobe® Reader™ version 5.0 or 
higher  
 A CareLink™ USB connectivity device (provided with your Paradigm Veo insulin 
pump) 
 A Blood Glucose Monitor with an appropriate cable if you would like to download 
this into CareLink Personal separately.  
 
The users and other actors who own a part in this Socio-Technical System include the 
user of the pump (the patient), the administrators of the user‘s Internet Service Provider, the 
administrators of the Internet server and CareLink website, and the additional consumers of the 
user‘s information such as the nurses, doctors, and administrators of the doctor‘s computer 
systems.  The type of information stored in the CareLink website is provided in Appendix A. 
According to Medtronic, ―The system also uses Secure Sockets Layer (SSL), a data 
encryption technology, which ensures that data is unreadable during the transfer.‖  Thus, an 
individual on the Internet would be required to crack the SSL session if trying to capture user data 
in an unauthorized fashion.   
The environments in which the insulin pump and CareLink computing systems operate 
are as varied as users‘ imaginations.  Today‘s PCs are quite mobile, small, portable, and 
powerful.  With a cellular based ISP, the insulin pump and PC components can be connected to 
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the Internet and the CareLink website from virtually anywhere in the world under all types of 
environmental conditions.  Some of these environments for consideration include automobiles on 
our highways, hotels, hospitals, parks, etc.  In these different physical environments, some 
adverse conditions may influence the Socio-Technical System such as an automobile accident in 
which the user is injured, hospital coded conditions, and Internet connection dropouts in remote 
areas of parks. 
2.2.2 Pacemaker 
According to the Mayo Clinic [10], ―a pacemaker is a small device, about the size of a 
pocket watch, that's placed under the skin near your heart to help control your heartbeat. People 
may need a pacemaker for a variety of reasons — mostly due to one of a group of conditions 
called arrhythmias, in which the heart's rhythm is abnormal.‖  Appendix A depicts placement of a 
pacemaker in the body. 
The Medtronic CareLink Network pacemaker remote monitoring system depicted in 
Figure 2 ―ensures timely identification of clinically important issues, such as asymptomatic atrial 
fibrillation or device integrity issues.‖[11] The Medtronic CareLink Network device provides the 
user with critical device conditions including the following [11]: 
Full parameter summary 
Percent pacing 
Real-time and magnet EGM 
Battery voltage and longevity 
A-V conduction histograms 
Arrhythmia summary with Mode Switch duration 
Lead impedance and trends 
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Figure 2.  The Medtronic CareLink Network pacemaker remote monitoring system. 
The Biotronik wireless Home Monitoring™ (HM) system provides patients protection 
during all stages of cardiac resynchronization therapy (CRT)[12].  Figure 3 shows the wireless 
device attached to a user‘s waist belt. According to Biotronik‘s website, the HM system provides 
the following benefits: 
Early Detection of Atrial Arrhythmias 
Resynchronization Therapy Management 
Lead Monitoring 
ERI Monitoring 
 
Figure 3.  The Biotronik pacemaker Home Monitoring system. 
An example of Resynchronization Therapy Management [13] (e.g., reduction of patient‘s 
hear rate) is shown in Figure 4.  The figure shows a trend analysis of uploaded user data.  This 
data provides a trend analysis of PII and might prove embarrassing or politically harmful to the 
patient if released to unauthorized personnel.  The data and analytical products may also 
contribute to company proprietary analyses or hospital research studies of medications and patient 
treatments, all of which should be protected like the PII from unauthorized disclosure. 
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Figure 4.  Reduction of the patient heart rate variability. 
An advantage of network based monitoring systems is that medical research efforts can 
analyze data to determine improved medical care.  Lazarus [14] analyzes a database of patient 
pacemaker information gathered from a remote, wireless Home Monitoring™ system (HM).  
Their objective was to describe ―the daily routine application of a new telemonitoring system in a 
large population of cardiac device recipients.‖  One of the most notable observations made was 
that the average amount of time that a patient spends in a visit with a physician when an issue was 
detected was significantly shortened from regularly scheduled visits.  According to Lazarus [14], 
The mean interval between last follow-up and occurrence of events notified by HM was 
26 days, representing a putative temporal gain of 154 and 64 days in patients usually 
followed at 6- and 3-month intervals, respectively. 
They conclude that such monitoring systems ―improve the care of cardiac device 
recipients, enhance their safety, and optimize the allocation of health resources.‖ 
Access to user information contained in an individual pacemaker device appears 
controlled; albeit achieved through wireless technologies.  However, the environment of this 
pacemaker Socio-Technical System extends across the Internet to doctors, researchers, and their 
respective computing systems. 
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2.2.3 Instant Heart Rate Application 
Modulo offers a free application on the Android and iPhone smartphones called Instant 
Heart Rate [15].  It measures a user‘s heart rate using the built-in camera.  The user places their 
finger over the camera, holds it steady for at least 10 seconds, and then the current heart rate will 
be shown on the display as shown in Figure 5.   
While this device is not imbedded in the user, it is technically closely worn and requires 
the user to interact with the smartphone device.  One could imagine that in the (near) future, the 
stored information could be sent to doctors, hospitals, and online medical services much in the 
same way as the H‘andy Sana 210 discussed above. 
 
Figure 5. Instant Heart Rate smartphone application. 
According to the developers at Modulo [16], ―the application has been made as a part of a 
study that uses sensors built into mobile phones for measuring biological signals.‖  This study 
was not described on their website.  Thus, the nature, intent, and access controls of additional 
actors are unknown.   
Initially, the environment of the application was limited to the user‘s smartphone and to 
this unknown study.  We might assume the information was transferred from the smartphones to 
the study computing environment via the Internet.  Additionally, the application saves heart rate 
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detection events in order to improve performance.  The application allows the user to connect to 
the Internet and display PII (by choice).  Specifically, the application can be configured to 
―tweet‖ a user‘s heart rate.  Figure 6 shows a recent twitter feed displayed on Modulo‘s web site 
[17].  On a personal note, this author uses this application but chooses not to tweet results.  
However, it is unknown if the data is automatically used for the unknown study. 
 
Figure 6.  Twitter feed of users‘ heart rates. 
2.3 Failure 
The following subsections describe ―failure‖ in the context of instrument and user 
operations in a Socio-Technical System.  The purpose is to define and enumerate how 
instruments and users fail. 
2.3.1 Definitions 
This section provides a review of general definitions of failure and how failure relates to 
the dependability and security of a system. 
Merriam-Webster [18] defines ―failure‖ as, ―a state of inability to perform a normal 
function.‖  
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Dictionary.com [19] defines ―failure‖ as, ―nonperformance of something due, required, or 
expected: a failure to do what one has promised; a failure to appear.‖  
The Committee on National Security Systems in the National Information Assurance (IA) 
Glossary [20] defines the following relevant terms: 
fail safe - Automatic protection of programs and/or processing systems when hardware or 
software failure is detected. 
fail soft - Selective termination of affected nonessential processing when hardware or 
software failure is determined to be imminent. 
failover - The capability to switch over automatically (typically without human 
intervention or warning) to a redundant or standby information system upon the failure or 
abnormal termination of the previously active system. 
failure access - Type of incident in which unauthorized access to data results from 
hardware or software failure. 
failure control - Methodology used to detect imminent hardware or software failure and 
provide fail safe or fail soft recovery. 
 Avizienis, Laprie, et al.[21] provide a graphical representation of the taxonomy of 
attributes for dependable and secure computing as shown in Figure 7, which depicts faults, errors, 
and failures as a threat to the dependability of a system.   
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Figure 7.  Laprie‘s dependability model.  Sommerville used ―Impediments‖ instead of 
―Threats‖. 
 
Dewsbury, Sommerville, et al.[6] use the term ―Impairments‖ instead of ―threats‖ based 
on an earlier work by Laprie [22].  While faults, errors, and failures are a threat to the 
dependability of a system, the term threat is quite often used to describe an external client which 
may violate the security of a system.  Bishop [23] defines threat as follows:  
A threat is a potential violation of security.  The violation need not actually occur for 
there to be a threat.  The fact that the violation might occur means that those actions that 
could cause it to occur must be guarded against (or prepared for). 
While instrument and user failures and environmental situations ―threaten‖ the 
confidentiality, availability, and integrity of information within a Socio-Technical System, by 
Bishop‘s definition failures and situations are not the threat.  So, in this paper, we will consider 
users as the threat or ―threat actors‖; the term impairments will be used to describe faults, errors, 
and failures; and the term threat will be used to describe a potential violation of security. 
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We can say that instrument and user failures and environmental situations weaken a 
Socio-Technical System for exploitation by threat actors.  In order to mitigate these threats, a 
security model will employ the principle of least privilege as defined by Saltzer [24].  This 
distinction will be illustrated in the example presented in Section 3.2.  Saltzer [25] defines the 
principle of least privilege as follows: 
Every program and every privileged user of the system should operate using the least 
amount of privilege necessary to complete the job. 
Avizienis, Laprie, et al. [26] examine faults in even greater detail and comprised a rather 
comprehensive taxonomy as shown in Figure 8. 
 
 
Figure 8.  Avizienis‘ and Laprie‘s, et al., ―elementary‖ fault classes. 
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When combined together, the dependability taxonomy in Figure 7 with the elementary 
fault classes of Figure 8, result in a refined dependability and security tree as shown in Figure 9.  
However, even with these refinements, the users remain outside the system.  According to Laprie 
[26], users are ― entities (humans or other systems) that receive service from the system at their 
use interfaces.‖   
 
Figure 9. A refined dependability and security tree. 
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To find out how user faults fit into these dependability taxonomies, we look at a few 
more definitions of dependability attributes.  Sommerville [5] discusses the concept of 
dependability and four principal dimensions as follows: 
Availability.  Informally, the availability of a system is the probability that it will be up 
and running and able to deliver useful services at any given time. 
Reliability. Informally, the reliability of a system is the probability, over a given period 
of time, that the system will correctly deliver services as expected by the user. 
Safety.  Informally, the safety of a system is a judgment of how likely it is that the system 
will cause damage to people or its environment. 
Security.  Informally, the security of a system is a judgment of how likely it is that the 
system can resist accidental or deliberate intrusions.  
Sommerville [5] further presents that dependability properties are not applicable to all 
systems.  As an example, he discusses an insulin pump (an example of instrument).   
For the insulin pump system,…,the most important properties are availability (it must 
work when required), reliability (it must deliver the correct dose of insulin), and safety (it 
must never deliver a dangerous dose of insulin).  Security, in this case, is less likely to be 
an issue, as the pump will not maintain confidential information and is not networked so 
cannot be maliciously attacked. 
While a probably true statement at the time Sommerville published this example in 2007, 
technology improvements erode such deductions.  Instruments can now store more information 
and can connect to networks.  INFOSEC implications are very real.  Information stored in 
instruments must be protected from unauthorized disclosures (confidentiality).  The Medronic 
Guardian REAL-time insulin pump[27] discussed in Section 2.2.1 offers advanced monitoring 
and infusion of insulin.  The system is also integrated into the user‘s home network and 
communicates data to/with medical systems used by health care professionals. 
Dewsberry [6] describes Confidentiality and Integrity in terms of home-based and 
domestic Socio-Technical Systems as follows: 
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While the need for integrity goes without saying, the issue of confidentiality is much 
more difficult in situations where elderly people depend on monitoring technology that 
alerts relatives and carers [care givers] when a problem arises.  These elderly users often 
value their privacy and wish to maintain the confidentiality of their personal information.  
On the other hand, this may compromise the safety of the overall system as it may limit 
the speed and type of response in the event of a problem.  The level of confidentiality in a 
system therefore cannot be fixed but has to be programmable and responsive to an 
analysis of the events being processed by the system. 
The last sentence in the description above suggests that the environment in which a 
Socio-Technical System operates influences confidentiality of information in a variable fashion. 
Dewsbury [6] accommodates user interactions with ―dependable‖ home-based (Socio-
technical) systems by deriving additional characteristics, namely trustworthiness, acceptability, 
fitness for purpose, and adaptability.  The logic for doing so stemmed from the following 
assumptions: 
People are not automatons and act in unpredictable ways. 
We cannot monitor our brains to identify erroneous states. 
Identifying the fault which resulted in a failure is impossible. 
This last assertion, while true, is misleading.  For the purpose of a Socio-Technical 
System, a person‘s ―fault‖ is not required.  Instead, what is required is just the recognition of a 
user failure.  Thus, when we recognize hardware or processing failures at the boundary of a 
Technical Computer-Based System we can recognize user failures at the border of the user when 
that user is considered an integral participant in the operation/function of a Socio-Technical 
System.  And so, identifying a resource that classifies user failures is an important goal of this 
paper. 
Section 2.3.3 describes user failures in terms of the International Classification of 
Diseases (ICD).   The ICD provides a very straight forward, hierarchical, and comprehensive 
taxonomy of user physiological and psychological conditions.  
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2.3.2 Instrument Failure 
The presentation above provides a review of general definitions of failure and how 
failures generally relate to the dependability and security of a system.  This section will highlight 
instrument failures that dynamically impact data availability and user role assignments.  In 
Section 1, a new access control model is presented that can represent these failures and their 
changes to data access control protections. 
Instruments usually operate under specific physical conditions including temperature, 
humidity, and/or vibration limitations.  Exceeding these limitations may result in component 
breakdowns and system failures.  One aspect of the system may fail leaving other functionalities 
operational. 
One example includes operator error with a partial but critical failure.  In this example, 
the support operator of a hearing aid installs the ―receiver unit‖ (wire that transports signals into 
the ear) with the hearing aid base.  Figure 10 shows the receiver unit properly connected to the 
hearing aid base.  If the receiver unit fails to connect, a connection pin may be broken.  Figure 11 
shows a broken electrical connection in the hearing aid base.  In this example, the hearing aid 
fails because it is no longer able to deliver a signal externally to the user‘s ear but otherwise 
remains operational.  It still retains all information and is still able to connect to a configuration 
system.  However, no procedure is in place to protect the information stored in the hearing aid.  
As a result, other operators, administrators, and engineers are provided access to user‘s PII.  
While technically these support personnel are authorized to access the PII, users may be unaware 
of such disclosures.  From the instrument perspective, it ―Failed open‖ in that it is still able to 
communicate with the configuration computer and transmit/receive information. 
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Figure 10.  A receiver unit properly connected to the hearing aid base. 
 
Figure 11.  A broken receiver unit connection pin on the hearing aid base. 
Another type of failure occurs when a technician or user improperly configures a device.  
For example, in the previous hearing aid failure, a replacement hearing aid is subsequently used.  
However, the technician neglects to configure the device.  While the device works with 
preprogrammed default settings, it is not properly synchronized with the other hearing aid nor 
configured for the user‘s hearing deficits.  One feature of hearing aids is that different listening 
modes can be selected by the user depending on environmental conditions.  However in this 
example, the devices are not configured and do not synchronize.  Thus, when the user selects a 
different hearing mode, only one of the hearing aids changes modes while the other‘s operational 
mode remains unchanged.  Thus, the device fault results in the failure to provide the user with 
20 
 
 
 
properly synchronized hearing modes of operations.  While the devices operat, they failed to 
operate as expected in total.  The devices may or may not detect such synchronization failures but 
continue to operate in an independent fashion.  Thus, the devices do not ―fail soft‖ since there is 
no termination of function.  
Finally, another type of failure occurs with regular expectation.  A low battery condition 
renders a hearing aid partially useful.  Its volume slowly decreases until it becomes totally 
inoperative.  During this short period of non-useful but operating condition, a user will seek out 
new replacement batteries.  However, inserting batteries into such a small device requires a 
relatively high level of fine motion dexterity. Without such a capability a user may introduce 
additional personnel to assist with this procedure.  Physical access to a device may render the 
information stored within susceptible to unauthorized disclosures.  
2.3.2.1 Instrument Failure Impacts 
Instrument failures impact data availability and user role assignments in the instruments 
presented in this thesis.  Table 1 summarizes these impacts.  Further below, each of the five types 
of instrument failures is presented and the actual or possible changes in data availability and user 
role assignments are discussed. 
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Table 1.  Instrument failures and their impacts to user role assignments and data 
availability. 
 Low 
Battery 
Lost 
Wireless 
Signal 
Broken 
Connector 
Clogged Tube Low Medicine, 
Solution 
Pacemaker UA, D UA, D UA, D - - 
Insulin 
Pump 
UA, D UA, D UA, D UA, D UA, D 
Hearing 
Aids 
UA, D UA, D UA, D UA, D - 
H‘andy 
Sana 210 
D UA, D UA, D - - 
Instant 
Heart Rate 
D D D - - 
Zephyr 
Heart Rate 
D UA, D UA, D - - 
ICE: In 
Case of 
Emergency 
D D D - - 
ICE 
Medical 
ID Card 
- - UA, D - - 
Cardio 
Trainer 
D D D - - 
Electric 
Sheep 
D D D - - 
Ultrasound UA, D - D - UA, D 
UA = User Role Assignment impact 
D = Data Availability impact  
<dash> = Not Applicable 
2.3.2.1.1 Low Battery 
While technically not a failure, the Low Battery condition in an instrument allows a user 
to anticipate a system failure.  Inevitably, without recharging or changing the battery, we can 
assume the system will ultimately fail to operate.  During this transition, the user‘s health may be 
at grave risk.  In this intermediate state between full-power and predestined system shut-down 
(possibly ending in a disaster for the user), system developers may anticipate proper handling, 
disposition, and access controls to information contained in the system.   
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Hypothetically, in order to conserve power a system might be programmed to eliminate 
certain communication functions, security capabilities, or user information retrieval utilities.  
System designers may alter the functionality of a system based on power levels in order to 
maintain the most critical safety functions.  For example, in order to maintain a safe condition for 
the user, the developers of a pacemaker, insulin pump, or hearing aid may disable all 
communications channels, performance adaptation operations, and maximum strength (volume) 
settings.  The systems may revert to a mode of operation that maintains life and user safety 
conditions in anticipation of an eventual recharge.  Hopefully, the system developers would also 
have developed a means to notify the user (e.g., hearing aid beeps) of such a condition so that the 
user can take appropriate actions.   
With systems that include a user‘s cell phone, the users may elect to shut down certain 
power consuming functions such as Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, cell signal, or GPS.  In doing so, the 
functionality of the system may be adversely affected.  Some or all data may not be collected by 
the system.  Data may no longer be uploaded to the user‘s laptop and/or further uploaded to a 
centralized web storage environment where the data would be accessible by additional 
information consumers.   
Under a Low Battery condition, a user‘s role may change.  For example, a family 
member, coworker, or complete stranger may be required to assist an individual with a pacemaker 
to contact medical facilities to recharge it.  In doing so, these users‘ role changes to a nurse or 
administrator in which a patient‘s PII may be required to facilitate care.  Additionally for other 
users, their role may not be assigned until the Low Battery condition applies. For example, a co-
worker or young family member may be required to recharge or change an instrument battery.  At 
that point in time, their role is assigned and then they perform their duty.   
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2.3.2.1.2 Lost Wireless Signal 
With Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and cellular wireless technologies, the distances between 
antennas, line-of-sight, and interferences may reduce data throughput or deny information flow 
entirely.  Like the Low Battery condition discussed above, data availability may be hampered in 
part or entirely.  For those instruments which utilize wireless technologies, a disrupted signal with 
reduced data throughput may dictate what information is transmitted.  For example, a pacemaker 
with a poor Bluetooth signal may be detectable by the instrument which may then transmit only 
critical configuration information.   
Also, a disrupted wireless hearing aid signal may require an assistant to plug the 
instruments into a computer via special wired connectors, thus completely bypassing the wireless 
line of communication.  In this example, the data transmitted may increase or decrease because it 
is acquired by a user through the wired interface and because the wireless interface failed.  For 
example, the wireless configuration settings, service set identifier (SSID), and security passphrase 
would not normally be transmitted via the wired interface, but, because the wireless interface is 
disrupted, this data may now be transmitted. 
However, user role assignments may also change given a failed wireless connection.  For 
example, a hearing aid user may request that a Local Area Network (LAN) administrator examine 
and repair the instrument‘s Bluetooth connection.  The role of the LAN administrator then 
changes to a certified hearing aid professional.  Another example involves the Zephyr Heart Rate 
monitor which also uses Bluetooth technology coupled with a smartphone.  In this example, the 
user asks the local Verizon cell phone technician to diagnose a Bluetooth technical failure.  Again 
the role of the cell phone technician changes to a Zeypher device technician.  A fair amount of PII 
resides on the smartphone for the Zephyr Heart Rate monitor application and therefore the model 
should anticipate changes to user role assignments.  
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A network hardware failure (or lack of service) would negate transfer of health 
information.  While a failed upload to Facebook or Twitter may only provide a slight annoyance, 
a failed upload to a hospital medical service may impair medical diagnosis in an urgent or even 
critical situation.  Access to the same information may require user owner permission in the form 
of a password.  A patient in distress may not be able to provide such authorization in order for 
emergency personnel to safely administer first-aid. 
2.3.2.1.3 Broken Connector 
A broken wire connection will most likely disrupt a communication flow.  A connection 
to an outside environment (e.g., usb connector, RS232 pin, firewire socket) would constitute a 
communications disruption similar to the lost wireless signal discussed above.  However, an 
internally broken connection may cause other data availability impacts.  For example, a broken 
connector pin between a hearing aid base and the receiver unit renders the instrument useless for 
the user.  In this situation the data in the instrument remains intact and otherwise operates as 
designed.  However, the hearing aid may not make all data available since the device should be 
returned to the manufacturer for repair.  Any PII may become unnecessarily available to the 
repair operator.  If the desire is to not make information contained within the instrument 
accessible to a repair operator, then the instrument could fail into a closed state, thus rendering 
the data unavailable.  
In some situations, one would anticipate failing an instrument into a state wherein no data 
or perhaps only configuration data is made accessible to a repair operator via an operational 
interface.  One could potentially configure an instrument to only provide such information under 
all failed and normal (e.g., check-up) conditions.  However, some or all PII may be required to 
actually perform a diagnosis and to validate the instrument upon repair.  From a modeling 
perspective, the roles for the user and repair operator do not change, just the access to whatever 
information is provided to the role upon an instrument failure. 
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Like the lost wireless signal, a user may consign an instrument administrator the role of a 
system technician in order to repair a broken connector.  For example, the ICE Medical ID Card 
in Appendix A may suffer a corroded USB connection after the wallet, which protected it, fell 
into a water source.  The user may ask the local pharmacist from the store the instrument was 
purchased to perform a repair.  Given that the pharmacist is a kind individual, the role changes to 
hardware technician. 
2.3.2.1.4 Clogged Tube 
Insulin pumps and hearing aids contain tubes which may at some time get congested or 
completely clogged.  This situation is similar in nature to an internally broken connector 
described earlier.  The potential impacts to data availability and user role assignments may 
change.  For example, should an insulin pump suffer a clogged tube, then the medication cannot 
be accurately dispensed.  The insulin pump may fail into a state wherein only the medication type 
and the dosage are displayed.  All other information may be hidden and the instrument ceases all 
other functions.  While this may cause a serious safety problem for the patient, it also translates 
into a situation where additional users may be authorized to access the limited amount of data and 
some users may be assigned new roles in order to repair the condition.  Thus, this example of a 
safety issue is also an example of an information security issue. 
2.3.2.1.5 Low Medicine/Solutions 
Insulin pumps include prescribed medications (insulin).  Low or empty reservoir 
condition is similar in nature to a low battery condition described earlier.  The potential impacts 
to data availability and user role assignments are similar to those of the clogged tube discussed 
above. 
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2.3.3 User Failure 
This section highlights user failures that dynamically impact data availability and user 
role assignments.  In Section 1, a new access control model is presented that can represent these 
failures and their changes to data access control protections. 
Users of instrument ―fail‖ in a variety of fashion.  For example, a patient with a 
pacemaker is subject to heart conditions including [28] Bradyarrythmias (slow heart rhythms), 
Hypertrophic Cardiomyopathy (thickening of the heart muscle), heart failure, or Syncope 
(fainting spells).   
The Medical community has developed and adopted a set of codified medical conditions 
of patients into a hierarchical structure.  Specifically, the ―International Classification of Diseases 
(ICD) is designed to promote international comparability in the collection, processing, 
classification, and presentation of mortality statistics.‖[29] While ―mortality statistics‖ provide a 
―fundamental source of demographic, geographic, and cause-of-death information‖ [30], the 
ICD10-CM provides a means to help track diagnoses, manage patient care, and track injuries in 
the US medical community. 
A few examples of these ICD10-CM codes [31] provide a useful reference for this thesis.  
These examples help demonstrate their contribution to the IS-RBAC model in Section 3.2. 
S46.021 Laceration of muscle(s) and tendon(s) of the rotator cuff of right shoulder 
S62.7   Multiple fractures of fingers   
S62.511 Displaced fracture of proximal phalanx of right thumb 
R40.222 Coma scale, best verbal response, incomprehensible words 
R45.4 Irritability and anger 
R45.5 Hostility 
R45.6 Violent behavior 
R45.7 State of emotional shock and stress, unspecified 
S06.0x8 Concussion with loss of consciousness of any duration with death due to other 
cause prior to regaining consciousness 
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2.3.3.1 User Failure Impacts 
Like instrument failures, user failures impact data availability and user role assignments 
in the instruments presented in this thesis.  Several types of user failures are presented in 
Appendix B.  Their ICD10-CM codes are included in this section.  Table 2 summarizes these 
impacts.  Further below, each of the three types of user failures is presented and the actual or 
possible changes in data availability and user role assignments are discussed. 
Table 2.  User failures and their impacts to user role assignments and data availability. 
 Mental States; 
ICD10-CM Series 
R40 and R45 
Arm/Hand Muscle 
Lacerations and 
Fractures; 
ICD10-CM Series 
S46 and S62  
Death; ICD10-
CM Series S06 
Pacemaker UA - UA 
Insulin 
Pump 
UA UA UA 
Hearing 
Aids 
UA - UA 
H‘andy 
Sana 210 
UA, D D UA 
Instant 
Heart Rate 
UA, D D UA 
Zephyr 
Heart Rate 
UA, D D UA 
ICE: In 
Case of 
Emergency 
UA - UA 
ICE 
Medical 
ID Card 
UA - UA 
Cardio 
Trainer 
UA, D D UA 
Electric 
Sheep 
UA, D D UA 
Ultrasound UA - UA 
UA = User Role Assignment impact 
D = Data Availability impact  
<dash> = Not Applicable 
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2.3.3.1.1 Mental States 
The mental state of a user impacts data availability of a Socio-Technical System.  If the 
user provides a password for access to data or plays an integral part in data transfer or elicitation, 
then a failure of the user may result in a failure of these functions and limit the data that may be 
accessible.  A few sample user mental states include ―coma where their best verbal responses are 
incomprehensible words‖ (ICD10-CM R40.222 in Appendix B), irritable/angry, hostile, violent, 
shock, and stress ((ICD10-CM series R45.x in Appendix B). 
Given such user mental states, data availability in an instrument may be affected.  For 
example, if the user is in a coma, it would be rather difficult to self-operate the Instant Heart Rate 
application which relies on the user‘s ability to place a finger over an LED on the smartphone 
instrument.  Likewise, the H‘andy Sana 210 application requires the user to place two fingers on 
separate contacts to complete an electric circuit. 
Given such user mental states, user role assignments in a Socio-Technical System may 
also be affected.  For example, an angry, stressed, or in-shock user may result in the addition of 
participating users such as a Good Samaritan to act in the role of a first responder (e.g., 
emergency medical technician (EMT)).  In the case of an insulin pump, the good Samaritan may 
communicate with medical staff in order to increase or decrease insulin dosage.   
As the scope of a Socio-Technical System expands to include administrators, operators, 
technicians, medical staff, etc., their mental states also affect other user role assignments.  
Basically, the mental state of these additional users may render their participation as ineffective 
as if the instrument owner‘s own mental state were impaired.  If a medical staff participates in 
information flow and they are the one mentally incapacitated, then user role assignments may 
change.  For example, an ambulance driver may take on the role of an EMT if the EMT‘s mental 
state is compromised (e.g., ambulance traffic accident).   
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Finally, the user‘s mental state may reach a point of long term incapacity.  In such a 
circumstance, legal responsibility of the user care and data ownership comes to bare.  The 
discussion regarding death covers the impact this may have on user role assignments, specifically 
data ownership. 
2.3.3.1.2 Lacerations and Fractures 
Like the mental states discussed above, lacerations and fractures of the arm/hand of a 
user may render their participation ineffective in a Socio-Technical System.   This physical 
limitation follows the same incapacity as the limitations of users‘ mental states discussed above.  
The impacts to data availability and user role assignments follow the same results.  However, 
with physical limitations, a user may still be able to participate in the Socio-Technical System by 
providing information to other participants verbally.   
2.3.3.1.3 Death 
ICD10-CM Series S06 involves death of the user.  Dimick [32] questions the complicated 
legal questions associated with confidentiality of PII when a data owner dies (the ultimate user 
failure).  He writes, 
A son calls the HIM department and requests his deceased father‘s medical records. 
Shortly afterward, the man‘s wife requests the records, also. Then a man calls identifying 
himself as the executor of the estate. Who is authorized to access the records? 
Determining appropriate release of a deceased patient‘s medical records can be complex. 
HIPAA, sometimes blamed for denied requests, is rarely cause for a roadblock, however. 
The federal law does extend a person‘s privacy rights into death, but it also explicitly 
requires facilities to release records to authorized individuals. 
While this thesis does not discuss legalities of data ownership, the fact that a user failure 
(especially the ultimate failure) changes expected and legal authorized access to information 
remains an imperative point.  By definition, the death of the user impacts the Socio-Technical 
System.  Elimination of the (only) participatory user from a Socio-Technical System may 
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transform it to just a Technical-computer system.  Access assignments for the remaining users of 
a Socio-Technical System should be explicitly defined or implicitly understood a priori to a user 
owner death in order to eliminate unauthorized information disclosures. 
While the death of a user is not a pleasant topic, it does present serious ramifications to 
user role assignments.  Specifically, the legal owner of the information stored in the Socio-
Technical System changes, even if the new owner is the original user‘s legal estate.  For the 
original user of the Socio-Technical System, the concept of data availability issues becomes 
irrelevant, except for perhaps the new data owner.  If the original user was irrevocably involved 
with the protection of data stored within the instrument or other component of the Socio-
Technical System, then perhaps data availability for the new data owner becomes relevant.  For 
example, if the original user maintained a password/phrase that granted root-like access to the 
data, then the new owner may require other technical solutions to acquire the data.  A forensic 
analysis may be required under these conditions which also introduce actors who will gain full 
access to data stored within the instrument.  
2.4 Environmental Situations 
This section highlights instrument failures that dynamically impact user role assignments.  
In Section 1, a new access control model is presented that can represent these failures and their 
changes to data access control protections. 
Some environmental situations control the roles users are assigned.  Some users may be 
required to perform duties with elevated privileges normally reserved for other users.  In such a 
case, some user role assignments may change. 
When a user‘s role assignments change with the given conditions of the environment, the 
user should not necessarily retain all access assignments for each environmental situation at the 
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same time.  The problem with combining all of a user‘s access assignments is that users may 
acquire different levels, types, complementary, or contradictory accesses.   
Table 3 summarizes three environmental situations that influence data availability and 
user role assignments for the Socio-Technical Systems presented earlier.  Each situation is 
discussed further below. 
Table 3.  Environmental situations and their impacts to user role assignments and data 
availability. 
 Hospital Code 
Red 
Airplane mode Displaced 
Pacemaker UA UA, D UA, D 
Insulin 
Pump 
UA UA, D UA, D 
Hearing 
Aids 
UA UA, D UA, D 
H‘andy 
Sana 210 
UA UA, D UA, D 
Instant 
Heart Rate 
UA D UA 
Zephyr 
Heart Rate 
UA UA, D UA 
ICE: In 
Case of 
Emergency 
UA D UA 
ICE 
Medical 
ID Card 
- - UA 
Cardio 
Trainer 
- D UA 
Electric 
Sheep 
- D UA, D 
Ultrasound UA - UA 
UA = User Role Assignment impact 
D = Data Availability impact  
<dash> = Not Applicable 
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2.4.1 Hospital Code Red 
During normal hospital situations, Registered Nurses (RNs) would only have authorized 
access to a portion of patient information and only to those patients assigned to their ward.  A 
patient who becomes violent, a missing child in the hospital, a (localized) fire, may trigger a 
―Code‖.  In a ―code red‖ situation, the Hospital administrators may establish that all RNs may 
gain access to all patient data in order to potentially help with patient care outside their normal 
duty stations. 
A large volume of patients may arrive at an emergency room in which a triage must be 
conducted.  A major catastrophe may also befall a hospital such as an earthquake, large scale fire, 
or widespread area flooding.  In such situations, a nurse may assume the role of a doctor, a clerk 
may assume the role of a trauma nurse, and a Good Samaritan may provide first responder care 
(determine patient vital signs).   
Medical personnel are subject to the same disabling diseases as patients and thus a 
shortage of staff may arise.  Medical personnel get called away and operational workloads may 
contribute to situations in which roles and responsibilities become greater for some personnel 
when otherwise would be reduced under normal conditions. 
In each of these situations, each person‘s explicit or implicit ―authorized‖ access to 
information changes.  It should be noted that the specific roles do not necessarily change (but 
they might); e.g., an RN in the nursery ward, third floor, south, remains the same.  However, in a 
code situation, they may be called upon to perform specific functions normally reserved for users 
in different roles.   
2.4.2 Airplane Mode 
A user‘s smartphone is sometimes considered an integral part of a Socio-Technical 
System.  Current FAA regulations prohibit transmission of cellular or Wi-Fi or Bluetooth 
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transmissions while airborne. This situation illustrates that there are environmental conditions that 
affect a Socio-Technical System and not just network or instrument failures.   The result of 
placing a device in Airplane mode should reflect the same impacts on those Socio-Technical 
Systems as those instrument failures described in Section 2.3.2.   
2.4.3 Displaced 
A displaced instrument arises when a user looses their smartphone, a broken hearing aid 
is returned for repair, or an obsolete pacemaker is replaced.  Like the death of the user, by 
definition this displacement of the instrument impacts the Socio-Technical System.  Elimination 
of the participatory user‘s instrument from a Socio-Technical System may transform it to just a 
user without a major Technical Computer-Based System component.  A displaced instrument is 
identical to the death of a user, from the perspective of the instrument; e.g., a lost instrument 
becomes a Technical Computer-Based System without an authorized user.  Someone who locates 
a displaced instrument may then conduct a forensic analysis and may gain full access to data 
stored within the instrument. Authorized access to the instrument and to the remaining 
components of a Socio-Technical System should be explicitly defined or implicitly understood 
when an instrument becomes displaced.  This will help eliminate unauthorized information 
disclosures of PII.   
2.5 Data Availability and User role assignments 
This section reviews the content of the previous sections with respect to data availability 
and user role assignments.  This will guide the structure of the IS-RBAC model presented later in 
Section 3.1. 
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Sommerville [5] defines Socio-Technical Systems as Technical Computer-Based Systems 
with  
defined operational processes,  
include people (operators [users]) as inherent parts of the system 
are governed by organizational policies and rules 
affected by external constraints such as national laws and regulatory policies. 
 
Socio-Technical Systems characterize instruments, computer systems, and users 
discussed previously.  The instrument failures arise within and at the boundaries of the Technical 
Computer-Based Systems.  The user failures arise also within and at the boundaries, given that 
people are inherent parts of the Socio-Technical System.  Finally, the environmental situations 
directly impact the operational processes of a Socio-Technical System. 
The impact of instrument failures, user failures, and environmental situations to Socio-
Technical Systems appears in two areas.  The first area affects the availability of data.  For 
example, a broken network interface would prevent data transfer and thus deny data availability 
through that interface.  However, another aspect of data availability lies with user interactions.  
For example, in order to transfer information from one entity to another, a system procedure may 
require a user to enter a password.  The classic interpretation of availability disregards such user 
interactions and draws the distinction that the system availability boundary ends with the ability 
to allow the user to enter the password and not include the user‘s interactions as part of the 
system.  While true for a Technical Computer-Based System, one could expand the system 
availability boundary to include user interactions as part of a Socio-Technical System.  For the 
purpose of this model, we will attempt to represent the impact of user interactions on the 
availability of data within Socio-Technical Systems. 
The second area affects the user role assignments. Thus the model should represent data 
conditional confidentiality.  Given that Technical Computer-Based Systems may include multiple 
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data interfaces, failure of one data flow interface (or other instrument) does not necessarily negate 
data flows through the other data interfaces (or other instruments).  However, when such failures 
occur, the access assignments to the data may change.  Our model must reflect this quality of 
Socio-Technical Systems. 
2.5.1 Data Availability 
Instrument failures affect a Technical Computer-Based System directly.  When a device 
fails, its operational state changes.  In failed states, the instrument may not be able to provide data 
to the user.  By definition, availability is the ability to provide data.  Therefore, an instrument‘s 
operational state affects the availability of instrument provided data. 
User failures affect Socio-Technical Systems in the same fashion as instrument failures.  
When a user ―fails‖, her participation in the Socio-Technical System becomes inhibited.  For 
example, she may not be able to provide a password or consent physically and/or mentally.  As 
such, the devices which store information may not be able to be accessed under normal 
conditions.  Therefore, a user‘s operational state can directly affect the availability of instrument 
provided data.   
2.5.2 User Role Assignments 
Instrument failures also affect Socio-Technical Systems.  When a device fails, its 
operational state changes.  In failed states, the instrument may still be able to provide data via 
other interfaces.   
User failed states may affect access assignments of other personnel through existing and 
working instrument interfaces.   Changes to data access assignments may be explicitly taken into 
account in anticipation of a user failure, since one may need to rely on another to enter such data 
or act on their behalf.  Thus, a user‘s failed states affect user data access assignments. 
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Like instrument and user failures, environmental situations affect Socio-Technical 
Systems.  User role assignments change given emergency situations and availability of other 
participants in the Socio-Technical System.   
We need a model that can establish user role assignments based on three new influences.  
Fortunately, the RBAC model provides a starting point. 
2.6 RBAC 
This section reviews several access control models.  This background information 
provides a starting point for development of the IS-RBAC model in the next section.   
2.6.1 Basic RBAC 
 Sandhu, et al. [33] present the RBAC model.  It establishes users, roles, and the role 
permissions within the confines of a single session.  Sandhu, et al. [33] define RBAC with the 
following components: 
U, R, P, and S (users, roles, permissions and sessions respectively), 
PA   P X R, a many-to-many permission to role assignment relation, 
UA  U X R, a many-to-many user to role assignment relation, 
user : S U, a function mapping each session si to the single user user(si) (constant for 
the session's lifetime),  
roles : S ! 2
R
, a function mapping each session si to a set of roles roles(si)   {r | (user(si), 
r)   UA} (which can change with time) and session si has the permissions   r   roles(si) 
{p | (p, r)    PA}.  We expect each role to be assigned at least one permission and each 
user to be assigned to at least one role. The model, however, does not require this. 
2.6.2 Context Sensitive 
Hulsebosch [34], et al. present the concept of a ―Context sensitive access control‖ model.  
A user‘s geographic location, device capabilities (battery power, memory, operating system), 
Network type (wifi, GSM) plays a part in determining user role assignments/rights.  The 
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conclusion of their research resulted in ―a relatively strong, less intrusive and more flexible 
access control process that mimics our natural way of authentication and authorization in the 
physical world.‖  The ―device capabilities‖ could potentially represent instruments in a Socio-
Technical System.  However, the model discussed by Hulsebosch does not include references to 
RBAC or any formal specification of an access control model. 
2.6.3 GeoTemporal 
Atluri [35] , et al., present the concept of a ―Geotemporal role-based authorization 
system.‖ In this model, the researches extend the RBAC model as a ―geotemporal role pair <r, 
sc>  where r is a traditional role for subjects as in RBAC role hierarchy, and sc is a scene that can 
be associated with a set of geospatial and temporal extents.‖  Formalisms for geospatial bounded 
boxes, and associated logical and functional operators are presented.  This allowed the 
researchers to ―specify subjects like ‗all the policemen who are in the fire scene‘ or ‗all the 
shoppers in the mall during Christmas season‘.‖  Based on these extensions, the RBAC model 
was able to represent a finer granularity of information access to users. 
In a similar fashion, Ray and Toahchoodee [36] present a ―Spatio-Temporal‖ RBAC 
model.  The location and time are represented and relate to users as atomic expressions.  These 
expressions provided a means to ―activate‖ and ―restrict‖ locations and temporal elements and 
were combined with user role assignments and with ―session roles‖, respectively.   
2.6.4 Fuzzy RBAC 
Nawarathna and Kodithuwakku [37] introduce the Fuzzy RBAC model.  FRBAC ―adds a 
new component called policy administration which models the organization security polices using 
a fuzzy approach.‖  Essentially, the policies associated with permission assignments PA are 
effectively not so readily assigned.  The PA computation is conducted in a dynamic fashion and 
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utilizes a ―fuzzy policy evaluator (FPE)‖.  With the FPE a dynamic permission assignment (DPA) 
is computed based on fuzzy data sensitivities and rules.   
2.6.5 Privacy Sensitive RBAC 
Q. Ni, et al.[38] summarizes Privacy Sensitivity RBAC (P-RBAC) as follows 
In P-RBAC, privacy policies are expressed as permission assignments (PA); these 
permissions differ from permissions in classical RBAC because of the presence of 
additional components, representing privacy-related information. The resulting model is 
clean and leverages the success of RBAC. However, because in our approach PRBAC 
policies may be authored by different users and also they may include a large variety of 
conditions, conflicts among PA may arise. To address such issue, in the paper we also 
develop conflict analysis algorithms to detect conflicts among PA, thus avoiding the 
problems that Enterprise privacy authorization language (EPAL) [IBM Zurich Research 
Laboratory, Switzerland ] rules have because of its sequential semantics Barth et al.[39]. 
Due to the complexity and variety of privacy policies and privacy requirements from 
different organizations, we employ a ―Divide and Conquer‖  methodology. That is, the 
models in our P-RBAC family are designed to meet different levels of requirements and 
handle different problems. The P-RBAC family includes four models: Core PRBAC, 
Hierarchical P-RBAC, Conditional P-RBAC and Universal P-RBAC. Core P-RBAC is 
the basic model and is able to directly represent privacy-crucial information, such as 
purpose of data use and obligations. However, although Core P-RBAC can be used to 
describe commonly used public privacy policies and some acts, the limited 
expressiveness of its condition language makes it not suitable for representing internally 
enforceable privacy policies for large scale enterprises and/or complex applications. 
Specifically, Core P-RBAC has the following limitations. First, Core P-RBAC only 
supports equality constraints on context variables in finite domains. Second, conditions 
are restricted to conjunctions of atomic formulas. Third, it only supports one type of 
relation, that we refer to as AND, among different permission assignments. The type of 
relation adopted by a set of permission assignments is crucial in determining which 
obligations need to be executed and which conditions have to be meet[ing] when several 
permissions may apply to the same request. 
A major shortcoming of Core P-RBAC is the limited expressive power of its condition 
language LC0.  For example, LC0 is not able to express conditions like 
(DataUser=―Alice‖) OR (DataUser=―Bob‖) because it only supports conjunction as 
logical operator. LC0 cannot deal with conditions like (8am < currentTime < 5pm) either 
because it only supports equality comparisons.  However, enhancing the expressiveness 
may result in a condition language which is not tractable.  In particular, to determine 
whether a condition in a permission assignment can be satisfied is essentially the classic 
NP-complete satisfiability problem (SAT) where only a few classes of formulae are 
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tractable. Therefore, for practical purposes, we divide our problem into two subcases, a 
tractable case and an intractable case, by carefully investigating commonly used 
conditions in privacy policies.  Correspondingly, we define Conditional P-RBAC as 
characterized by a two-fold solution as follows.  
– We define a more expressive condition language LC1 and introduce the concept of 
simple permission assignment set, for which SAT is tractable. 
– We define a fully expressive condition language LC2 and introduce the concept of 
advanced permission assignment set, for which SAT is theoretically intractable but 
remains tractable in practice given a reasonable assumption. 
The ―conditional P-RBAC‖ by qu. Ni et al. [38] at first glance looked like it might 
potentially represent the mechanical failings, user failings, and environmental situations discussed 
in this thesis.  However, the ―conditional‖ portion of Q. Ni‘s [38] model added numerous logical 
operators above the standard conjunction (―AND‖) operators found in Core-P-RBAC.  With 
disjunction operators, intractable situations arise.  Q. Ni, et al, [38] provides an algorithmic 
solution to intractable forms.  ―Conditional P-RBAC supports more expressive condition 
languages and more flexible relations between permission assignments.‖ 
The ―hierarchical P-RBAC ― by Q. Ni et al. [38], ―provides role hierarchies, data 
hierarchies, and purpose hierarchies.‖ The role hierarchy is used to represent organization 
structures, lines of authority, and areas of responsibilities.  Data hierarchies presume that access 
to a parent node data element is allowed only when access to all of its children node data 
elements is granted.  Finally, purpose hierarchy allows structure to relate information purposes.  
Like the data hierarchy, access to a parent node purpose is only granted when access to all of its 
children nodes are granted.   
The ―universal P-RBAC‖ portion of the model ―combines Hierarchical P-RBAC and 
Conditional P-RBAC, and inherits both their features. Such integration of Hierarchical P-RBAC 
and Conditional P-RBAC supports the specification of more complex relations between different 
permission assignments.‖  A universal data model might be considered ambitious, yet it may in 
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fact provide a solution to help represent instrument failures, user failures, and environmental 
situations.   
2.6.6 Adding Attributes 
Kuhn, et al. [40] discuss a perspective on how attributes can be added to RBAC model.  
Attribute-based access control (ABAC) ―might be more flexible than RBAC [because] it does not 
require separate roles for relevant sets of subject attributes, and rules can be implemented quickly 
to accommodate changing needs.‖  However, the complexity of an ABAC lies in its complexity 
of combining attributes.  Kuhn combines RBAC and ABAC as a strategy.  The strategy employs 
the combination of users, roles, and/or attributes.  For example, by using just users and roles, one 
achieves the basic RBAC model.  Likewise, by using just attributes, one achieves the basic 
ABAC model.  In total, ten combinations can be derived.  The last three strategies use all three 
elements, but in different quantities.  Roles with attributable names constitute a attribute-centric 
approach.  Attributes that constrain roles constitute a role-centric approach.  Finally, the use of 
―dynamic‖ roles, results in a dynamic role approach.  
  
  
3 Impediment Sensitive - RBAC Model 
This thesis presents a variation of the RBAC model.  It is termed an Impediment 
Sensitive RBAC (IS-RBAC) model and may be applied in a Socio-Technical System.  This 
section presents a short review of the models discussed so far, the requirements per se of the IS-
RBAC model, and the source of the ―Impediments‖.  This short review describes the new 
functionality and goals of IS-RBAC.  Subsequently, the definition of IS-RBAC and an example 
are presented. 
The complex P-RBAC model is not necessary to represent all the Socio-Technical 
Systems presented in this thesis.  For example, the ICE Medical Card and the ―Electric Sheep‖ 
application in Appendix A only involve a few actors and potential Technical Computer-Based 
Systems. However, for some of the Socio-Technical Systems discussed, a model that is based on 
a robust P-RBAC would be useful.  For example, the Zephyr Heart Rate Monitor and the Insulin 
Pump applications involve several actors and Technical Computer-Based Systems and potentially 
a variety of data consumers across the Internet.  However, a complex RBAC model such as P-
RBAC does not address the impediments, their implications to user role assignments, or the 
availability of data.   
Some RBAC models and variations integrate users, but without consideration of their 
function as within a Socio-Technical System.   User role assignments, attributed to a user, 
correctly assume that the user is the ultimate direct consumer of data and outside the boundary of 
a Technical Computer-Based System, e.g., not an integral part of the system.  With a Socio-
Technical System, data not only directly flows to and from a user, but data also potentially flows 
through a user to another user or Technical Computer-Based Systems, all of which make up the 
total Socio-Technical System. 
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The complex models that Q. Ni [2] employ treat users on the fringe of a Technical 
Computer-Based System; the Hierarchical P-RBAC, Conditional P-RBAC and Universal P-
RBAC.  Q. Ni [2] provides a ―more expressive condition Language(s)‖ LC1 and LC2 which 
introduces the concept of ―simple permission assignment set‖ and ―advanced permission 
assignment set‖, respectively.  The LC0 includes conjunction logical operator and equality 
comparisons.  The LC1 provides additional conditional operators such as or, less than, greater 
than.  However, they do not address aspects of data and instrument availability nor environmental 
situations. 
The issue is that all of the RBAC models can be used to represent a user, but none 
represent user failures (or user failure states).  Similarly, instruments could potentially be 
represented by ordered, unordered, hierarchical, or any of a dozen ―list‖ representation sets.  But 
equally, none represent instrument failures (or instrument failure states).   
Likewise, the model needs dimensions in order to represent instrument failures, user 
failures and environmental situations.  The model should also represent of user role assignments 
and ultimately access controls to information.  Finally, the model needs to represent impacts to 
data availability.   
The combination of instrument failures, user failures, and environmental situations reflect 
the ―impediments‖ as described in Section 2.3.1.  User medical conditions which prohibit or 
otherwise impair a user‘s ability to participate in authentication effectively degrades the integrity 
of authentication and therefore breaks the mechanism by which confidentiality is enforced.  The 
immediate consequence of these impediments results in marginal to full data availability 
constraints.  However, ultimately, these impediments result in changes to user role assignments 
which in turn result in changes to access controls which goes to data confidentiality.  In the 
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following sections we introduce an RBAC model sensitive to impediment failures and situations 
call IS-RBAC. 
3.1 IS -RBAC Definitions 
In this section, we introduce the IS-RBAC model with 5 new definitions.  As each 
definition is presented, the model solidifies a representation of how instrument failures, user 
failures, and environmental situations impact both data availability and user role assignments.  
Ultimately, the change in the data set and the set of user role assignments affect the access control 
model at its foundation.  
Definition 1. From Sandhu, et al.[33], we take the following components: 
- U, R, P, and S (users, roles, permissions and sessions respectively), 
Definition 2. The IS-RBAC model must represent data, a conditional language, 
instrument failures (or instrument availability states), and user failures (or user availability states).  
In addition to Definition 1 above, we begin the development of the new model with the following 
components: 
- A set D of data 
- A conditional language LC 
- A set I of instruments, a set S of operational states, a set   of environmental situations. 
- How does an instrument operational state dictate availability of data?  An instrument‘s 
operational state affects the instrument‘s ability to provide data.  By definition, 
availability is the ability to provide data.  Therefore, an instrument‘s operational state 
affects the availability of instrument provided data. 
-   = Instrument Availability States  I X S, a many-to-many instrument to operational 
state assignment relation. 
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- How does a user operational state dictate availability of data?  A user‘s operational state 
affects the user‘s ability to provide data or ability to authorize use of data.  By definition, 
availability is the ability to provide data.  Therefore, a user‘s operational state affects the 
availability of user provided data. 
-    = User Availability States   U X S, a many-to-many user to operational state 
assignment relation. 
- How do the environmental situations dictate availability of data?  While Environmental 
situations may affect the ability of an instrument or user to operate (i.e., Electro Magnetic 
Pulse), the result of such a situation should be covered by the instrument and user 
availability states presented above.  However, environmental situations may affect the 
instrument‘s and/or user‘s expectations to provide and/or consume data.  For example, 
building lockdown, martial law, and medical ―code red‖ effect which users are assigned 
specific roles.  Therefore, environmental situations affect user assignments.   
- Z = User Availability States   U X E, a many-to-many user to environmental situation 
assignment relation. 
Definition 3.  The IS-RBAC model must represent changes to data availability based on 
the instrument availability states  and user availability states  shown in Definition 2.  The new 
data sets D‘ and D‘‘ shown are derived from the original data set D, shown in Definition 1, and 
are sensitive to these M and Y availability states, respectively.  These two new data sets are then 
combined into a data set D‘‘‘.  In order to assure no duplicate data elements in D‘‘‘, we take the 
union of D‘ and D‘‘. 
- The set of Instrument Impediment Sensitive Data  
o D’ = {(d, )| d   D,      } 
- The set of User Impediment Sensitive Data 
o D’’ = {(d,  )| d   D,       } 
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- The set of all Impediment Sensitive Data 
o D’’’  {D’   D’’} 
Definition 4. We can now utilize the new set the Impediment Sensitive Data D‘‘‘ from 
Definition 3 and the set of users U, instruments I, and the conditional language LC from 
Definition 2 in order to define impediment sensitive data permissions IPD and their respective 
role assignments (IDPA).  The IDPA definition will be used in lieu of the permission to role 
assignment PA from the original RBAC model, which does not take into account data or data 
sensitivities to impediments.   
- The set of Impediment-sensitive Data Permission IDP = {(u, i, d, p, c)| u    U,  i    I, d    
D’’’, p    P, c is an expression of LC} 
- The set of Impediment-sensitive Data permission Assignment IDPA   R X IDP, a many-
to-many impediment-sensitive data permission to role assignment relation. 
Definition 5.  Instrument and user availability states also affect user role assignments.  
We represent this by preparing a many-to-many mapping of instrument and user availability 
states from Definition 2 to the user role assignments UA in RBAC.  Likewise, Environmental 
Situations affect user role assignments.  The result of the instrument and user availability states 
yield a final set of user role assignments as follows: 
- The set of User Availability Sensitive User role assignment 
o UA’     X R, a many-to-many user availability states to role assignment relation. 
o This is identical to the User role assignment in RBAC except that the set of users 
U has been replaced with the set of User Availability States   shown in 
Definition 2. 
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o The user‘s availability controls the roles users are assigned, such as when the 
user is non-responsive and cannot provide the password to retrieve data from the 
instrument.  In such a case, some user assignments to certain roles may change. 
- The set of Instrument  Availability Sensitive User role assignment 
o UA’’   X R, a many-to-many instrument availability state to role assignment 
relation. 
o This is identical to the User role assignment in RBAC except that the set of users 
U has been replaced with the set of Instrument Availability States  shown in 
Definition 2. 
o The instrument‘s availability controls the roles users are assigned, such as when 
the medical device is in low power and cannot connect to a wifi network to 
transmit data.  In such a case, some user assignments to certain roles may change. 
- Finally, Environmental situations may control the roles users are assigned, such as when 
the environmental situation in a hospital emergency room changes to a (medical) code 
red.  Some users (nurses) may be required to perform duties with elevated privileges 
normally reserved for other users (doctors).  Thus, we formulate a second set of User 
Availability Sensitive User role assignment. 
o UA’’’     X R, a many-to-many user availability state (due to environmental 
situations) to role assignment relation. 
o Like the definition for UA’, the definition of UA’’’ is identical to the User role 
assignment in RBAC except that the set of users has been replaced with the set of 
User Availability States Z which are sensitive to environmental situations as 
shown in Definition 2. 
o The environmental situations control the roles users are assigned, such as when a 
hospital is placed under a code red situation and then nurses may act as a 
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physician‘s assistant.  In such a case, some user assignments to certain roles may 
change. 
- The User role assignments UA’, UA’’, and UA’’’ need to be combined.  A simple union 
accomplishes this task. 
o UA’’’’   {UA’   UA’’   UA’’’}, an impediment sensitive user role assignment 
relation. 
Definition 6.  The impediment-sensitive data permission assignments IDPA of Definition 
4 effectively replace the permission role assignment PA in RBAC.  However, the definition of the 
user session relies upon PA.  Additionally, the impediment sensitive user role assignment UA’’’’ 
from Definition 5 replaces the user role assignment UA in RBAC.  Therefore, a slightly new 
definition of a session is required.  The changes to the session definition are shown below in bold 
underline. 
user : S U, a function mapping each session si to the single user user(si) (constant for 
the session's lifetime), and 
roles : S ! 2
R
, a function mapping each session si to a set of roles roles(si)   {r | (user(si), 
r)   UA’’’’} (which can change with time) and session si has the (impediment sensitive 
data) permissions   r   roles(si) {idp | (idp, r)    IDPA}. 
The final collection of IS-RBAC definitions include the following: 
- U, R, P, D, and S (users, roles, permissions, data, and sessions respectively), 
- A conditional language LC  
- I, S, E (instruments, operational states, and environmental situations, respectively), 
-   = Instrument Availability States  I X S, a many-to-many instrument to operational 
state assignment relation. 
-    = User Availability States  U X S, a many-to-many user to operational state 
assignment relation. 
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- Z = User Availability States   U X E, a many-to-many user to environmental situation 
assignment relation. 
- D’ = {(d, )| d   D,      }, The set of Instrument Impediment Sensitive Data  
- D’’ = {(d,  )| d   D,       }, The set of User Impediment Sensitive Data 
- D’’’  {D’   D’’}, The set of all Impediment Sensitive Data 
- IDP = {(u, i, d, p, c)| u    U, i    I, d    D’’’, p    P, c is an expression of LC}, The set of 
Impediment-sensitive Data Permissions 
- IDPA   R X IDP, Impediment-sensitive Data permission Assignment, a many-to-many 
impediment-sensitive data permission to role assignment relation.  
- UA’     X R, a many-to-many user availability states to role assignment relation. 
- UA’’   X R, a many-to-many instrument availability state to role assignment relation. 
- UA’’’     X R, a many-to-many user availability state (due to environmental situations) 
to role assignment relation. 
- UA’’’’   {UA’   UA’’   UA’’’} 
- user : S U, a function mapping each session si to the single user user(si) (constant for 
the session's lifetime), and 
- roles : S ! 2R, a function mapping each session si to a set of roles roles(si)   {r | (user(si), 
r)   UA’’’’} (which can change with time) and session si has the (impediment sensitive 
data) permissions   r   roles(si) {idp | (idp, r)    IDPA}. 
3.2 IS-RBAC Example 
The example in this section will draw upon the insulin pump described in Section 2.2.1.  
A description is provided of the Socio-Technical System and its two Technical Computer-Based 
Systems.  Also described are their operational conditions, four different failures, users, and the 
types of accesses to the patient‘s PII.  A discussion of the accesses is also provided.  Finally, this 
same information is presented using the IS-RBAC definitions. 
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3.2.1 IS-RBAC Example Description 
The device chosen for this example is the insulin pump described in Section 2.2.1.  Let‘s 
allow the device to be configured and modeled without IS-RBAC and then with IS-RBAC.  The 
application of IS-RBAC will illustrate how it helps mitigate threat actors towards a patient‘s PII.   
We introduce four impediments.  The first and second impediments are system failures, 
specifically a clogged tube in the insulin pump and an overload on the Web Server.  The third 
impediment is a user failure, specifically, the patient will suffer a type of coma.  The fourth 
impediment is an environmental situation, specifically a Hospital Code Red situation. 
The patient information stored in the device which requires protection includes the 
following: name, patient identity number, home address, birth date, type of diabetes, and insulin 
dosage.  A variety of roles are used including the patient, spouse, physician, physician assistant, 
etc.  The permissions for the user roles include Create, Delete, Read, and Update (CDRU). 
3.2.2 Unanticipated Role Accesses 
Prior to the application of IS-RBAC, expected user roles access controls may be defined. 
However, some unforeseen circumstances may occur such as instrument and user failures and 
environmental situations which without proper thought could allow elevated privileges.  This 
section depicts such a situation for access to patient PII, located within a Socio-Technical System 
made up of two Technical Computer-Based Systems (TCBS).  The first TCBS is an insulin pump 
worn by the patient, such as the one described in Section 2.2.1.  The second TCBS is the Web 
server that hosts the PII, such as the Google Health or Google Analytics also described in 
Appendix A.  This section describes four user-roles and their access types to the patient‘s PII on 
the two TCBS, respectively.  The access is partitioned into four types: create (C), read (R), update 
(U), and delete (D). The types of failures are described earlier in Section 2.3. 
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The elevated privileges, as a result of failure, negatively impact the confidentiality, 
availability, and integrity of the Patient‘s PII.  These impacts weaken the protections of the 
Patient‘s PII, expose the data to threat actors, and potentially harm the privacy or even safety of 
the Patient. 
Table 4 shows the access controls to a patient‘s PII, located on the insulin pump, for the 
Patient and Hospital Nurse roles.  The access controls here lack proper consideration of failures 
and environmental situations.  We see that under normal conditions the Hospital Nurse has no 
access to the patient‘s PII.  However, given any type of impediment situation, the Hospital Nurse 
gains full CDRU privileges.   
One could argue that the elevated privileges are the result of good intentions to allow the 
Hospital Nurse to provide uninhibited medical care.  However, the principle of least privilege 
begs the question as to whether the Hospital Nurse truly requires full access to the patient‘s PII 
under these conditions.  The intentions of the Hospital Nurse may result in harm to the Patient.  
Specifically, the Hospital Nurse could affect the confidentiality of the Patient‘s PII in the insulin 
pump by disclosing it to unauthorized persons.  Such an act would violate the Patient‘s privacy, 
especially given HIPPA regulations.  The Hospital Nurse could affect the availability of the 
Patient‘s PII in the insulin pump by disabling its display either intentionally or accidentally.  This 
could affect the safety of the Patient since other users, including the Patient, may be denied access 
to the dosage or medication data.  The Hospital Nurse could affect the integrity of the information 
in the insulin pump by changing the dosage settings.  Such a change could adversely affect the 
safety of the Patient.   
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Table 4. Expected and unforseen access to patient PII located on the insulin pump. 
 Expected Unforeseen 
Roles Normal 
Conditions 
Insulin Pump 
Clogged Tube 
Patient Failure: 
Coma scale, best verbal 
response, 
incomprehensible words 
(R40.222) 
Environment: 
Hospital Code Red 
Patient CDRU CDRU CDRU CDRU 
Hospital 
Nurse 
 CDRU CDRU CDRU 
 
Table 5 shows the access controls to a patient‘s PII located on the web server for the 
Patient, Physician‘s Assistant, Web Server Global Support, and Web Server Technical Support 
roles.  Here too we see the access controls lack proper consideration given a Web Server 
Overload failure.  We see that under normal conditions the web support roles have no access to 
the patient‘s PII.  But, as soon as there is a Web Server Overload, users in both support roles gain 
full CDRU privileges.   
One could argue that the elevated privileges are the result of good intentions to allow the 
support users to provide uninhibited repairs to the server should, in the unlikely event, a Patient‘s 
PII becomes the source of a system failure.  However, the principle of least privilege begs the 
question as to whether these support roles truly requires full access to the patient‘s PII under these 
conditions.  Their intentions may include a sinister goal which may result in harm to the Patient.   
Specifically, the Web Server Technical Support user could affect the confidentiality of 
the Patient‘s PII on the Web Server by disclosing it to unauthorized persons across the Internet.  
Such an act would violate the Patient‘s privacy, especially given HIPPA regulations.  The Web 
Server Global Support user could affect the availability of the Patient‘s PII on the web server by 
moving content to other locations in the web server‘s file structure either intentionally or 
accidentally (e.g., backup and delete original).  This could affect the safety of the Patient since 
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other users, including the patient‘s physician, may be denied access to the dosage or medication 
data at a point in time when the patient suffers from a serious condition (e.g., insulin shock).  The 
support users could affect the integrity of the information on the web site by deleting the patient‘s 
data.  Such a change could also adversely affect the safety of the Patient. 
Table 5. Expected and unforeseen access to patient PII, located on the web server. 
 Expected Unforeseen 
Roles Normal 
Conditions 
Web 
Server 
Overload 
Patient Failure: 
Coma scale, best verbal 
response, incomprehensible 
words (R40.222) 
Environment: 
Hospital Code 
Red 
Patient CDRU CDRU CDRU CDRU 
Physician 
Assistant 
R  CDRU CDRU 
Web Server 
Global 
Support 
 CDRU   
Web Server 
Technical Support 
 CDRU   
 
3.2.3 Authorized Role Accesses 
Table 6 and Table 7 depict the authorized IS-RBAC to patient PII, located within the 
Socio-Technical System presented in Section 3.2.2. 
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Table 6.  Authorized IS-RBACs to patient PII located on the insulin pump. 
Roles Normal 
Conditions 
Insulin Pump 
Clogged Tube 
Patient Failure: 
Coma scale, best verbal 
response, 
incomprehensible words 
(R40.222) 
Environment: 
Hospital Code Red 
Patient CDRU R CDRU CDRU 
Physician CDRU R CDRU CDRU 
Physician‘s 
Assistant 
CDRU R CDRU CDRU 
Employer   R  
Web Server 
Global 
Support 
    
Web Server 
Technical 
Support 
    
Hospital 
Nurse 
 R RU R 
Hospital 
Technical 
Support 
    
Patient‘s 
Online 
Pharmacist 
    
Paramedic    R  
Ambulance 
Driver 
  R  
NOTE: the grayed cells will be used as a sample session. 
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Table 7.  Authorized IS-RBACs to patient PII located on the Web Server. 
Roles Normal 
Conditions 
Web Server 
Overload 
Patient Failure: 
Coma scale, best verbal 
response, 
incomprehensible words 
(R40.222) 
Environment: 
Hospital Code Red 
Patient CDRU CDRU CDRU CDRU 
Physician R  R R 
Physician‘s 
Assistant 
R  R R 
Employer   R  
Web Server 
Global 
Support 
 R CDRU  
Web Server 
Technical 
Support 
 R   
Hospital 
Nurse 
  R R 
Hospital 
Technical 
Support 
  R R 
Patient‘s 
Online 
Pharmacist 
R  R R 
Paramedic    R  
Ambulance 
Driver 
    
NOTE: the grayed cells will be used as a sample session. 
A discussion of the accesses for each type of user role is in order.  The patient has the 
same accesses to the PII located in both the insulin pump and web server regardless of the type of 
failure, even when the patient fails into a coma, yet cannot express a password to retrieve the 
information.  In this case, the patient doesn‘t have access to much of anything anyway.  The only 
information available on the insulin pump may be displayed without the use of a password or, 
more importantly, if the insulin pump has a clogged tube, is the medication and dosage.  It is 
55 
 
 
 
assumed that users who are authorized to CDRU other data fields will retain and protect a (pin 
number) password.  This user failure in the role of the patient will play an important part in the 
user role assignment discussed further below. 
The physician and physician‘s assistant have identical accesses.  Full access is provided 
to the PII located in the insulin pump but only reader access to the PII located on the web server.  
This is because the insulin pump is the primary source of PII and thus is the location from which 
these users provide their service.  The web server is a source by which they only read the 
information. 
The employer, paramedic, and ambulance driver will all participate as good Samaritans 
and will be able to read the patient‘s PII located on the insulin pump.  However, because the 
employer has an explicit relationship with the patient (employee) and because the paramedic (but 
not the ambulance driver) has an implicit relationship with the patient, they will be able to read 
the patient‘s PII from the web site if the patient suffers from a coma (or other incapacitating 
failure). 
The web server technical (and global) support users gain access to the patient‘s PII 
online, should the web server suffer a failure.  The web server global support users gain full 
CDRU access, should the user suffer a coma.  In Section 3.2.4, we  illustrate the access control 
gains a user receives due to role reassignments 
The hospital nurse will not have access to the patient‘s PII located in the insulin pump or 
web server under normal conditions.  However, the hospital nurse may need to update the 
information in the same fashion as the physician, should the patient fail into a coma.  She may 
need to read the PII on the insulin pump given the remaining impediments.  However, the hospital 
nurse will only have reader access to the patient‘s PII, located on the web server, if the patient is 
in a coma or if the hospital is under a code red. 
56 
 
 
 
The hospital technical support has the same access as the hospital nurse, only from the 
web server. 
Finally and conversely to the web technical support, the patient‘s online pharmacist has 
reader access to the patient‘s PII on the web site as long as the web server does not fail. 
3.2.4 Role Re-assignments 
Now we need to consider role changes due to various failure types.  Let‘s take a look at 
the patient, Web Server Global Support, Physician‘s Assistant, and Nurse roles. 
3.2.4.1 Assignment to the Patient Role 
Jane is Bob‘s spouse and Bob is the patient.  We could set up a new role called ―spouse‖ 
with a set of accesses and assign Jane that role or we could allow Jane to assume the role of 
patient as described in the IS-RBAC model under certain conditions.  One feasible situation in 
which this may occur is when Bob becomes incapacitated (e.g., user failureR40.222) and can no 
longer express the password.  Jane would then assume the role of the patient with the elevated 
accesses and privileges. 
3.2.4.2 Assignment to the Web Server Global Support Role 
Reese assumes the role of the Web Server Technical Support role.  Leslie assumes the 
Web Server Global Support role.  If the patient falls into a diabetic coma or the insulin pump gets 
clogged, Reese‘s role remains unchanged.  However, let‘s assume Leslie does not know how to 
handle the web server failure where it becomes overloaded, such as in a SYN-ACK distributed 
denial of service attack.  Since Reese understands how to address this particular issue, Leslie 
assigns Reese the Web Server Global Support role in order to handle the situation.  Right or 
wrong, Reese would gain elevated privileges, specifically CDRU of the PII of the patient on the 
web server, when Reese normally has R (reader) access. 
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3.2.4.3 Assignment to the Physician’s Assistant Role 
Angle is a Hospital Nurse.  When the patient‘s insulin pump becomes clogged, Jessie, the 
physician‘s assistant may assign Jessie‘s own role to Angel in order to facilitate repairs of the 
insulin pump.  In this situation, Angle gains CDRU (full) access to the patient‘s PII located in the 
insulin pump when normally, Angle only has R (reader) access. 
3.2.4.4 Assignment to the Nurse Role 
Rob is a paramedic and Angel is a nurse.  As a nurse, Angel may only read PII from the 
patient‘s insulin pump or from the web server when the patient is incapacitated.  However, when 
an environmental situation occurs, such as when the hospital adopts a code red circumstance, 
Angle may advocate for paramedic Rob to be assigned the Nurse role (assuming Rob is at the 
hospital).  Under this role change, Rob gains no additional access to the patient‘s PII on the web 
server.  However, notice that should the patient fall into a coma, Rob would gain the additional U 
(update) access to the patient‘s PII located on the insulin pump when before the environmental 
situation and patient‘s coma Rob only had R(reader) access.   
3.2.5 Threat Mitigation 
Without IS-RBAC, the RBAC model represents user role access controls under normal 
operating conditions.  Should a user be reassigned to another role, the RBAC model represents 
the accesses the user will inherit and follows the principle of least privilege.  Doing so 
strengthens the weaknesses caused (only) by user role changes to the protection of the Patient‘s 
PII and helps prevent potential harm to the patient. 
For example, Table 5 and Table 7 indicate that under normal conditions the Hospital 
Nurse has no access to the patient‘s PII located on the insulin pump or the web site.  Should the 
user be reassigned the role of the Physician‘s Assistant, the user would gain full CDRU access to 
the patient‘s PII on the insulin pump and would gain R (reader) access to the patient‘s PII on the 
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web site.  Again, the RBAC model sufficiently represents this change in access controls, but only 
under normal conditions. 
The application of the IS-RBAC model allows instrument and user failures and 
environmental situations to be represented so that additional access controls can be applied.  
Doing so follows the principle of least privilege.  It also strengthens the weaknesses caused to the 
protection of the Patient‘s PII by user and instrument failures and environmental situations, 
mitigates threats from users with elevated user role privileges, and ultimately helps prevent 
potential harm to the Patient.  
Let‘s take a look at the changes made to the access controls for the Hospital Nurse, Web 
Server Global Support, and the Web Server Technical Support roles.  For the Hospital Nurse role, 
in Table 4 we see that under any adverse condition, the user gains full CDRU access.  Once IS-
RBAC is applied, we see from Table 6 that the user access is reduced to just R (reader) access for 
the insulin pump clogged tube, RU (reader update) access for when the patient suffers a coma, 
and R (reader) access when the Hospital enters a Code Red situation; a substantial reduction in 
access.  This change protects the patient‘s PII such that the Hospital Nurse can no longer affect 
the availability of the data and has limited ability to potentially affect the integrity of the data. 
For the Web Server Global Support and Web Server Technical Support roles, in Table 5 
we see that the web server overload condition allows for full CDRU access.  After IS-RBAC is 
applied, as shown in Table 6, their access are reduced to just R (reader).  This change protects the 
patient‘s PII such that the support users can no longer affect the availability or integrity of the 
data. 
3.2.6 IS-RBAC Example Definitions 
Now we can take the IS-RBAC information described in the previous section and 
illustrate it using the IS-RBAC definitions. 
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The set U of users: 
U = {Bob, Jane, Dakota, Jessie, Bert, Reese, Leslie, Angel, Parker, Taylor, Rob, Skyler}  
The set R of roles: 
R = {Patient, Physician, Physician’s Assistant, Employer, Web Server Global Support, 
Web Server Technical Support, Hospital Nurse, Hospital Technical Support, Patient’s Online 
Pharmacist, Paramedic, Ambulance Driver} 
A set P of permissions: 
P = {C (create), R (read), U (update), D (delete)} 
A set D of data: 
D = { Bob, 15-January-1990, AZ896745, 123 Main Street Anytown USA, Gestational 
Diabetes, Glynase, 20 mg, myWeakPassword } 
A condition language LC. 
A set I of instruments 
I = {insulin pump, web server} 
A set S of operational states 
S = {normal, overloaded, clogged tube, “Coma scale, best verbal response, 
incomprehensible words (R40.222)” } 
A set Ε of environmental situations. 
E = {Normal, Hospital Code Red} 
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Μ = Instrument Availability States  I X S, a many-to-many mapping instrument to 
operational state assignment relation. 
M = {insulin pump:normal, insulin pump:clogged tube, web server:normal, web 
server:overloaded} 
Υ  = User Availability States   U X S, a many-to-many mapping user to operational state 
assignment relation. 
Y = {Bob:normal, Bob:” Coma scale, best verbal response, incomprehensible words 
(R40.222)”, for brevity the rest of the users are associated with the normal state} 
Z = User Availability States   U X E, a many-to-many user to environmental situation 
assignment relation. 
Z = {Rob: normal, Rob: Hospital Code Red}  
The set of Instrument Availability Sensitive Data  
D’ = {(d,μ)| d   D, μ   Μ } 
Table 8 shows that when instruments fail, only specific information may be available.  
The permissions for each data element will be assigned later, therefore this table and the two that 
follow contain X‘s to indicate the overall data field availability.  For example, when the insulin 
pump suffers a clogged tube, the device could be programmed to display only the medication and 
the dosage.  This will assist the patient and technician with repairs or replacement without having 
to navigate through the device menu screens.  Similarly, when the web server becomes 
overloaded, it too could be programmed to provide only the most critical information in order to 
reduce the amount of information processed and maximize server performance.  
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Table 8.  Data sensitivities to instrument failures. 
 insulin pump: 
normal 
insulin pump: 
clogged tube 
web server: 
normal 
web server: 
overloaded 
Bob X  X  
15-January-1990 X  X X 
AZ896745 X  X X 
123 Main Street 
Anytown USA 
X  X  
Gestational 
Diabetes 
X  X X 
Glynase X X X X 
20 mg X X X X 
myWeakPassword X  X  
 
The set of User Availability Sensitive Data 
D’’ = {(d, υ)| d   D, υ   Υ } 
Table 9  clearly suggests that when the patient Bob suffers from any condition in which a 
physician observes he is in a form of a coma with incomprehensible verbal responses, that he will 
not be able to provide the password information.   
Table 9.  Data sensitivities to user failure. 
 Bob:normal Bob:‖ Coma scale, best verbal response, 
incomprehensible words (R40.222)‖ 
Bob X X 
15-January-1990 X X 
AZ896745 X X 
123 Main Street 
Anytown USA 
X X 
Gestational 
Diabetes 
X X 
Glynase X X 
20 mg X X 
myWeakPassword X  
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The set of all Availability Sensitive Data 
D’’’  {D’   D’’} 
The result of this equation is the combined columns of Table 8 and Table 9 as shown in 
Table 10. 
Table 10.  Data sensitivities to Impediments. 
Data Bob, 
insulin 
pump, web 
server: 
normal 
Impediments 
insulin 
pump: 
clogged 
tube 
web server: 
overloaded 
Bob:‖ Coma scale, best 
verbal response, 
incomprehensible words 
(R40.222)‖ 
Bob X   X 
15-January-1990 X  X X 
AZ896745 X  X X 
123 Main Street 
Anytown USA 
X   X 
Gestational Diabetes X  X X 
Glynase X X X X 
20 mg X X X X 
myWeakPassword X    
 
IDP = {(u, i, d, p, c)| u    U,  i    I, d    D’’’, p    P, c is an expression of LC}, The set 
of Impediment-sensitive Data Permissions 
The easiest method to depict this information is to create a summary table based on the 
information from Table 10 and include the permissions associated with the data sensitivities to 
impediments.  Essentially, if the data is available on the devices or from the patient Bob, then the 
information includes all of the permissions CDRU.  Otherwise, none of the permissions are 
available, with the exception when the insulin pump has a clogged tube.  In this situation, user 
roles will only be able to read the medication and dosage for the patient located on the insulin 
pump.   
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A partial computation of IPD illustrates how Table 11 is generated. 
IDP = { 
Insulin pump: 
Impediments = Null then  
Bob:CDRU and 15-January-1990:CDRU and AZ896745:CDRU and 123 Main 
Street Anytown USA:CDRU and Gestational Diabetes:CDRU and 
Glynase:CDRU and 20 mg:CDRU and myWeakPassword:CDRU ; 
Impediment = insulin pump:clogged tube then  
Glynase:R and 20 mg:R;  
 . . . 
Web server: 
Impediments = Null then  
Bob:CDRU and 15-January-1990:CDRU and AZ896745:CDRU and 123 Main 
Street Anytown USA:CDRU and Gestational Diabetes:CDRU and 
Glynase:CDRU and 20 mg:CDRU and myWeakPassword:CDRU ; 
Impediment = insulin pump:clogged tube then  
Bob:CDRU and 15-January-1990:CDRU and AZ896745:CDRU and 123 Main 
Street Anytown USA:CDRU and Gestational Diabetes:CDRU and 
Glynase:CDRU and 20 mg:CDRU and myWeakPassword:CDRU;  
 . . . 
Bob: 
Impediments = Null then  
 myWeakPassword:CDRU; 
Impediment = insulin pump:clogged tube then  
 myWeakPassword:CDRU; 
. . . 
} 
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Table 11.  IDP: Data sensitivities to Impediments and associated permissions; per data 
souce. 
Data Bob, 
insulin 
pump, web 
server: 
normal 
Impediments 
insulin 
pump: 
clogged 
tube 
web server: 
overloaded 
Bob:‖ Coma scale, best 
verbal response, 
incomprehensible words 
(R40.222)‖ 
Bob CDRU   CDRU 
15-January-1990 CDRU  CDRU CDRU 
AZ896745 CDRU  CDRU CDRU 
123 Main Street 
Anytown USA 
CDRU   CDRU 
Gestational Diabetes CDRU  CDRU CDRU 
Glynase CDRU R CDRU CDRU 
20 mg CDRU R CDRU CDRU 
myWeakPassword CDRU    
NOTE: the grayed cells will be used as a sample session. 
IDPA   R X IDP, Impediment-sensitive Data permission Assignment, a many-to-many 
impediment-sensitive data permission to role assignment relation. 
The easiest method to depict this information has already been provided earlier in Table 6 
and Table 7.  These two tables clearly depict which roles have authorized accesses to data.  When 
combined with the IPD provided in Table 11, a complete IPDA emerges.  A partial computation 
of IPDA is shown below.   
IDPA = { 
Physician‘s Assistant: 
Insulin pump: 
Impediments = Null then  
Bob:CDRU and 15-January-1990:CDRU and AZ896745:CDRU and 123 
Main Street Anytown USA:CDRU and Gestational Diabetes:CDRU and 
Glynase:CDRU and 20 mg:CDRU and myWeakPassword:CDRU ; 
Impediment = insulin pump:clogged tube then  
Glynase:R and 20 mg:R;  
  . . . 
Web server: 
Impediments = Null then  
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Bob:CDRU and 15-January-1990:CDRU and AZ896745:CDRU and 123 
Main Street Anytown USA:CDRU and Gestational Diabetes:CDRU and 
Glynase:CDRU and 20 mg:CDRU and myWeakPassword:CDRU ; 
Impediment = insulin pump:clogged tube then  
Bob:CDRU and 15-January-1990:CDRU and AZ896745:CDRU and 123 
Main Street Anytown USA:CDRU and Gestational Diabetes:CDRU and 
Glynase:CDRU and 20 mg:CDRU and myWeakPassword:CDRU;  
  . . . 
 Bob: 
Impediments = Null then  
 myWeakPassword:CDRU; 
Impediment = insulin pump:clogged tube then  
 myWeakPassword:CDRU; 
. . . 
Hospital Nurse: 
 Insulin Pump: 
Impediments = Null then  
Null ; 
Impediment = insulin pump:clogged tube then  
Glynase:R and 20 mg:R;  
  . . . 
 Web server: 
Impediments = Null then  
Null ; 
Impediment = insulin pump:clogged tube then  
Null;  
  . . . 
 Bob: 
Impediments = Null then  
 null; 
Impediment = insulin pump:clogged tube then  
 null; 
. . . 
. . . } 
 
The set of User Availability Sensitive User role assignment 
UA’   Υ X R, a many-to-many mapping user availability states to role assignment 
relation. 
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Table 12 shows that one person who normally serves no role in this system, Bob‘s spouse 
Jane, assumes the role of the patient for the purpose of information control in the situation where 
Bob suffers a diabetic coma.  The remainder of the user role assignments does not change under 
this condition. 
Table 12.  User role assignments with sensitivity to user failure. 
Roles Bob:normal Bob:‖ Coma scale, best 
verbal response, 
incomprehensible 
words (R40.222)‖ 
Patient Bob Bob, Jane 
Physician Dakota Dakota 
Physician‘s 
Assistant 
Jessie Jessie 
Employer Bert Bert 
Web Server 
Global 
Support 
Leslie Leslie 
Web Server 
Technical 
Support 
Reese Reese 
Hospital 
Nurse 
Angel Angel 
Hospital 
Technical 
Support 
Parker Parker 
Patient‘s 
Online 
Pharmacist 
Taylor Taylor 
Paramedic  Rob Rob 
Ambulance 
Driver 
Skyler Skyler 
 
The set of Instrument Availability Sensitive User role assignment 
UA’’   Μ X R, a many-to-many mapping instrument availability state to role assignment 
relation. 
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Table 13 shows how Angle and Reese, the Hospital Nurse and Web Server Technical 
Support personnel, respectively, gain elevated access to the patient‘s PII when devices fail and 
their roles change. 
Table 13.  User role assignments with sensitivity to instrument failure. 
Roles insulin pump: normal 
and 
web server: normal 
insulin pump:  
clogged tube 
web server: 
overloaded 
Patient Bob Bob Bob 
Physician Dakota Dakota Dakota 
Physician‘s 
Assistant 
Jessie Jessie, Angel Jessie 
Employer Bert Bert Bert 
Web Server 
Global 
Support 
Leslie Leslie Leslie, Reese 
Web Server 
Technical 
Support 
Reese Reese Reese 
Hospital 
Nurse 
Angel Angel Angel 
Hospital 
Technical 
Support 
Parker Parker Parker 
Patient‘s 
Online 
Pharmacist 
Taylor Taylor Taylor 
Paramedic  Rob Rob Rob 
Ambulance 
Driver 
Skyler Skyler Skyler 
 
 Finally, Environmental situations may control the roles users are assigned, such 
as when the environmental situation in a hospital emergency room changes to a medical code red.  
Some users (nurses) may be required to perform duties with elevated privileges normally reserved 
for other users (doctors). 
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 UA’’’   Z X R, a many-to-many mapping instrument availability state to role 
assignment relation. 
Table 14 shows how Rob, the Paramedic, is assigned the role of Hospital Nurse under the 
environmental condition when the hospital personnel operate under a Code Red. 
Table 14.  User role assignments sensitive to environmental situation. 
Roles Normal Hospital Code Red 
Patient Bob Bob 
Physician Dakota Dakota 
Physician‘s 
Assistant 
Jessie Jessie 
Employer Bert Bert 
Web Server Global 
Support 
Leslie Leslie 
Web Server 
Technical Support 
Reese Reese 
Hospital 
Nurse 
Angel Angel, Rob 
Hospital Technical 
Support 
Parker Parker 
Patient‘s Online 
Pharmacist 
Taylor Taylor 
Paramedic  Rob Rob 
Ambulance Driver Skyler Skyler 
 
 The User role assignments UA‘, UA‘‘, and UA‘‘‘ need to be combined.  A 
simple union will accomplish this task. 
 UA’’’’   {UA’   UA’’   UA’’’} 
The UA’’’’ is achieved by combining Table 12,  Table 13, and Table 14.  The rows 
remain the same and all the columns are included.  The result is shown in Table 15. 
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Table 15.  Impediment sensitive user role assignments. 
Roles Bob, 
insulin pump,  
web server, 
environment: 
normal 
Impediments 
Bob:‖ Coma scale, best 
verbal response, 
incomprehensible words 
(R40.222)‖ 
insulin 
pump:  
clogged 
tube 
web server: 
overloaded 
Hospital 
Code 
Red 
Patient Bob Bob, Jane Bob Bob Bob 
Physician Dakota Dakota Dakota Dakota Dakota 
Physician‘s 
Assistant 
Jessie Jessie Jessie, 
Angel 
Jessie Jessie 
Employer Bert Bert Bert Bert Bert 
Web Server 
Global 
Support 
Leslie Leslie Leslie Leslie, 
Reese 
Leslie 
Web Server 
Technical 
Support 
Reese Reese Reese Reese Reese 
Hospital 
Nurse 
Angel Angel Angel Angel Angel, 
Rob 
Hospital 
Technical 
Support 
Parker Parker Parker Parker Parker 
Patient‘s 
Online 
Pharmacist 
Taylor Taylor Taylor Taylor Taylor 
Paramedic  Rob Rob Rob Rob Rob 
Ambulance 
Driver 
Skyler Skyler Skyler Skyler Skyler 
NOTE: the grayed cells will be used as a sample session. 
Finally, we come to the session which is the instantiation of all these previous definitions.   
user : S →U, a function mapping each session si to the single user user(si) (constant for 
the session's lifetime), and 
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roles : S ! 2
R
, a function mapping each session si to a set of roles roles(si)   {r | (user(si), 
r)   UA’’’’} (which can change with time) and session si has the (impediment sensitive data) 
permissions   r   roles(si) {idp | (idp, r)    IDPA}. 
When a user initiates a session, the impediment sensitivities are instantiated, data 
sensitivities computed, permissions calculated, and roles assigned.  If one of the impediments 
occurs or terminates, the user sessions, impediments, role assignments, etc. are recomputed. 
Let‘s take two sessions from the example provided.  For reference, these sessions draw 
the information indicated by the grayed cells in Table 6, Table 7, Table 11, and Table 15.  The 
sessions include a small subset of the same users, roles, devices, data, etc. except in the first 
session, where no impediments shall exist.  In the second session, we will initiate one of the 
impediment scenarios.  The result of each session is an Impediment Sensitive table that describes 
the role, user assignments, and authorized accesses to specific data on specific instruments. 
In the first session, Jessie is the Physician‘s Assistant and Angel is a hospital nurse.  In 
general, the PII on both the insulin pump and the web server may be CDRU‘ed since all the PII is 
available.  Jessie is authorized to CDRU all of the patient‘s PII on the insulin pump but may only 
R (read) the same information from the web server.  Angel however, is not authorized to any of 
the patient‘s PII on the instrument or web server. 
Table 16.  Impediment free session. 
Roles User Role Assignment 
UA‘‘‘‘ 
Authorized to patient PII  
located on the insulin pump  
or web server 
Physician‘s 
Assistant 
Jessie CDRU all data: insulin 
pump 
R all data: web server 
 
Hospital Nurse Angel  
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Now let‘s introduce an impediment scenario, specifically the clogged tube on the insulin 
pump.  As summarized in Table 17, the authorized access is R (read) for all data for both Jessie 
and Angle.  However, the impediment sensitive data allows only the medication and dosage to be 
accessed from the insulin pump.  Regardless, all of the information may be read from the web 
server.  For Angel, this constitutes a significant gain in access to the patient‘s PII.  Angle rose 
from no access to the ability to read all of the patient‘s PII. 
Table 17.  Clogged tube on the insulin pump session. 
Roles User Role Assignment 
UA‘‘‘‘ 
Authorized to patient PII  
located on the insulin pump  
or web server 
Physician‘s 
Assistant 
Jessie and Angel R all; only available data: 
medication & dosage; 
insulin pump 
R all; available data: all;  
web server 
Hospital Nurse Angel R all; only available data: 
medication & dosage; 
insulin pump 
 
 
3.3 Summary 
This section presented the IS-RBAC model.  Five new definitions were added to the 
standard RBAC model in order to represent instrument and user failures and environmental 
situations.  With RBAC, the unanticipated role accesses were shown to negatively impact the 
confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the Patient‘s PII.  These impacts weaken data 
protections, expose the data to threat actors, and potentially harm the privacy or even safety of the 
Patient. 
The IS-RBAC model was applied to the example scenario user role assignments with 
authorized role accesses in a Socio-Technical System.  Role reassignments were discussed and 
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modeled for a set of four impediments.  The IS-RBAC model allows the impediments to be 
represented so that additional access controls can be applied.  Doing so strengthens the 
weaknesses caused to the protection of the Patient‘s PII by user and instrument failures and 
environmental situations, mitigates threats from users with elevated user role privileges, and 
ultimately helps prevent potential harm to the Patient. 
The next section discusses the conclusions made from this thesis.  Also presented are 
some ideas for future work on the IS-RBAC model. 
  
  
4 Conclusions 
In this thesis, a variation of the standard RBAC model, termed an Impediment Sensitive 
Role-Based Access Control (IS-RBAC), was developed.  IS-RBAC represents the sensitivities to 
data availability and user role assignments that instrument and user failures and environmental 
situations have on Socio-Technical Systems.  We added five definitions to the standard RBAC 
model to generate the new IS-RBAC model.   
This thesis discusses the differences in the granularity between how the standard RBAC 
model and the new IS-RBAC model represent data, impediments, user role assignments and 
access controls.  Specifically, the application of the IS-RBAC model allows instrument and user 
failures and environmental situations to be represented so that additional access controls can be 
applied.  It also strengthens the weaknesses caused to the protection of the Patient‘s PII by user 
and instrument failures and environmental situations, mitigates threats from users with elevated 
user role privileges, and ultimately helps prevent potential harm to the Patient.  IS-RBAC follows 
the principle of least privilege.   
To demonstrate the feasibility of the IS-RBAC model, we examined a number of 
embedded or closely worn medical devices.  These devices along with the patient, physician, and 
other actors were presented as examples of Socio-Technical Systems.  IS-RBAC was then applied 
to an example Socio-Technical System which consisted of an insulin pump, web server, patient, 
PII, and a variety of additional user roles.  We used an established dependability and security 
taxonomy that classifies instrument failures and an internationally accepted medical taxonomy 
that classifies user failures.  We discussed several types of environmental situations which were 
also shown to impede user role assignments and data availability.  Based on these taxonomies and 
example environmental situations we enumerated four impediments.  These impediments were 
applied to the definitions of the IS-RBAC model as an example scenario in order to represent new 
user role assignments and data availability for the Socio-Technical System. 
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The IS-RBAC model contributes to an associative relationship between the availability 
and the confidentiality properties of a system.  By definition, the information in a system must be 
available when needed.  We have illustrated and demonstrated that impediments from 
instruments, users, and environment affect both the availability of data and user role assignments.   
While RBAC can represent users and roles, IS-RBAC can further represent instruments, 
data, failures, and environmental situations.  While RBAC can represent user role assignments 
and permissions, IS-RBAC can further represent these same user role assignments and 
permissions under variable data availability conditions when instruments and users fail and when 
environmental situations change.  RBAC allows user role assignments to change during an 
established session and thus mitigates the threat from users gaining unauthorized access to data.  
IS-RBAC capitalizes on this feature so that when a user role changes, unauthorized access to data 
is mitigated, under additional conditions, when instruments and users fail and when 
environmental situations change.    
  
5 Future work 
It seems feasible that one could use portions or the entire IS-RBAC model with additional 
definitions found in other RBAC models.  For example, the user role assignment, UA, found in 
Q. Ni‘s [2] Core P-RBAC model, might be directly substituted with the definition of UA’’’’ in the 
IS-RBAC model.  The benefit of doing so would allow the impediments modeled in IS-RBAC to 
be included in the Core P-RBAC model and its subsequent applications.  Such a combination of 
RBAC modeling may yield an even more comprehensive solution to a wider variety of real world 
conditions and solve a greater number of INFOSEC requirements.   
The Laprie‘s taxonomy of Dependability was used to enumerate impediments for the IS-
RBAC model.  How much more of the Dependability model can be merged into RBAC in a 
similar fashion?  For example, Laprie‘s Dependability and Security taxonomy shown in Figure 7 
depicts the ―means‖ by which a system is rendered dependable.  Specifically, by modeling 
preventions, tolerance, removal, and forecasting, it may be possible to including these dimensions 
into some form of RBAC.  By continuing along this line of model combination one may 
eventually define a Dependability Sensitive RBAC.  Conversely, one could examine whether any 
of the existing derivations of the RBAC model already contain elements in Laprie‘s taxonomy of 
Dependability.  For example, in Laprie‘s Dependability and Security taxonomy, ―attributes‖ of a 
Dependability and Security model include well established INFOSEC concepts of Availability, 
Confidentiality, and Integrity.  An understanding of how those aspects are represented in an 
RBAC model may prove useful in defining a Dependability and RBAC Security model. 
What does a session mean in a Socio-Technical System?  A session in the original RBAC 
applies to a single Technical Computer-Based System.  Since a Socio-Technical System is 
composed of multiple Technical Computer-Based Systems, it stands to reason that to represent a 
session in a Socio-Technical System requires another dimension.  Instead of session si, where i 
represents a single session instance, we need session sij, where j represents the instantiation of a 
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set of multiple Technical Computer-Based Systems.  This modification may allow multiple 
RBAC modeled systems join into a Socio-Technical System. 
The IS-RBAC model was designed for a Socio-Technical System.  Could it be used for a 
single Technical Computer-Based System?  It seems feasible to do so if we drop all impediments 
except for those associated with a single Technical Computer-Based System.  The result would be 
an IS-RBAC without concern for user failures or environmental situations.  The faults of the 
single system could be enumerated and used to define user role assignments and data availability.  
Essentially, it would remove all columns (dimensions) of impediments listed in the tables of 
Section 3 except for those associated with a single instrument.  Likewise, the user failings could 
be disposed of or if not needed, removed from enumeration.  The result would be an IS-RBAC 
based on just a set of unified Technical Computer-Based System which could be viewed as a 
monolithic system. 
  
  
6 Appendix A: Additional Embedded or Closely Worn Medical 
Devices 
This appendix continues the discussion of implanted or closely worn medical devices 
from Section 2.2. 
6.1 Insulin Pump: CareLink Website 
The type of information stored in the CareLink website is shown in Figure 12 and Figure 
13 below.  Here we see the user name and the date of recent data uploads.  The data uploads 
include blood glucose and sensor glucose levels, and insulin infusions.  Data reports as shown in 
Figure 14 can also be printed and emailed to user‘s outside the boundary of the Socio-Technical 
System. 
 
Figure 12.  User information (e.g., PII) on the CareLink website. 
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Figure 13.  Logbook entry on the CareLink website. 
 
Figure 14.  PII and medical information on the CareLink website. 
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6.2 Pacemaker 
Figure 15 depicts the placement of an implanted pacemaker in the human body. 
 
Figure 15.  A pacemaker placement. 
 
6.3 Hearing Aid 
The Siemens ―Pure‖ hearing aid shown in Figure 16 also includes two sizes of Bluetooth 
remote controls as shown further in Figure 17 and Figure 18.    
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Figure 16.  Siemens Pure hearing aid. 
 
Figure 17. Siemens Pure hearing aid with Bluetooth remote control. 
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Figure 18.  Siemes Pure hearing aid with pocket remote control. 
Access to information stored in the devices is performed via a wired interface or a 
wireless Bluetooth interface and software from the manufacturer.  Siemens‘ ―Connexx‖ software 
―…uses the power of your PC to give you additional precision when fitting Siemens advanced 
technology programmable hearing instruments.‖[41]  The software is available only for licensed 
hearing professionals or for clinical studies through a ―mySiemens‖ account (or for creative users 
at software sharing websites) and required interface hardware can be purchased on eBay.   
It is important to note that ―no PII is stored in the [hearing aid] device, only the 
programming necessary for the device and the serial number assigned to the device.‖[42]  PII is 
stored in a centralized (perhaps the ―cloud‖?) database separate from the device and used by 
technicians and their administration PCs for configuring devices.  From a single Technical 
Computer-Based System perspective, confidentiality of PII remains a non-issue for this device.  
However, the device is part of a larger Socio-Technical System including the Bluetooth remote 
controller, the user‘s Bluetooth enabled smartphone, the user‘s Bluetooth enabled audio system 
(TV, MP3 player, etc.), the technician‘s programming workstation, and the technicians‘ 
centralized database server. 
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The hearing aid device limits PII exposure to a user‘s computing environment by not 
including identity information such as name, SS#, address, email, etc.  A simple enough 
approach, however, the devices do retain a serial number that associates the device and the 
information stored within, to the user information stored in a networked computing environment.  
Since the devices store a large amount of medical information and can be connected to networks, 
and contain a reference number that links the user to the PII, we must expand the definition of the 
simple hearing aids devices to include all these interacting elements. 
Like the insulin pump Socio-Technical System described earlier, the users and other 
actors include the user of the hearing aid, the administrators of the technician‘s Internet Service 
Provider, the administrators of the Internet server and Connexx website, and the additional 
consumers of the user‘s information such as the nurses, doctors, and administrators of the 
doctor‘s computer systems. 
Within the confines of a widely defined Socio-Technical System, a malicious user might 
be able to access PII via the serial number that provides a direct key index to the PII stored in the 
database.  Additionally, data integrity remains an issue since a malicious user could potentially 
change a serial number and obtain unauthorized access to the necessary programming for another 
user.   
The environments in which the hearing aids operate are very similar to the insulin pump 
presented earlier.  However, a major component is absent in the hearing aid Socio-Technical 
System, namely, the user‘s PC.  Instead, the technician‘s PC is required to transfer user data 
across the Internet to a centralized computer.  Regardless, nature of the operational environments 
remains similar.   
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6.4 H’andy Sana 210  
The H'andy sana[43] 210 is a mobile phone that includes an application called ―Heart 
Suite‖, see Figure 19 and Figure 20 below.  Technically, this device is not imbedded in the user 
or connected via wires or wireless network.  Instead, it measures a user‘s Electrocardiogram 
(ECG) by putting two fingers on the sensor field of the H‘andy sana 210.  Thus, the connection 
from the user to the device is temporary and controlled by the user.  This instrument operates in 
the same types of environments as other instruments presented above.  It allows a user to take 
their ECG instantly from anyplace and send it to the hospital or doctor for interpretation. H'andy 
sana 210 has a 2.8 inch full touch screen and full-fledged mobile phone capabilities including 
multimedia suite, Internet browser, calendar, built-in camera with screen viewfinder and 
dedicated menus. It offers online health suite services to store data like blood pressure, 
cholesterol, blood glucose, and ECG monitor results. 
 
Figure 19. The H‘andy Sana 210 with ―Heart Suite‖ ECG phone. 
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Figure 20. The H‘andy Sana 210.  Placing fingers on the sensors. 
6.5 ICE: In Case of Emergency Application 
Appventive provides an ―In Case of Emergency‖ (ICE) application[44] for the Android 
smartphone.  A user enters the following information which can be easily retrieved by ―first 
responders‖: 
•A list of people to call -- can call directly from the app 
•Insurance information 
•Primary doctor's name and number -- can call directly from the app 
•Allergies 
•Medical Conditions 
•Medications 
•Any special instructions or other information you wish to provide 
 
Figure 21 depicts the user owner information stored in the ICE application.  This 
application is fashioned after the old fashioned commonplace medical alert 
bracelets/necklaces. Under normal operating conditions, ―first responder‖ users do not 
access PII because the owner user typically controls content with physical restraint.  However, it 
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is expected that should the owner user become incapacitated (a user ―failure‖), the first responder 
user will be authorized to retrieve the information.  
The environment of this application appears limited to the user‘s smartphone.  However, 
users may provide first responders or medical personnel with physical control of the device.  At 
that point, the environment in which the device operates expands to any other Technical 
Computer-Based System or actors that the new actor operates. 
 
Figure 21.  Sample ICE screen shots. 
6.6 Heart Rate Monitor 
SportsTrackLive offers the Zephyr heart rate monitor, a bioharness, and an Android 
smartphone application.  The Zepher Bioharness module monitors a user‘s heart rate, breathing 
rate, and skin temperature.  The Zephyr HxM module showed in Figure 22 monitors heart rate 
and cadence.  The Sprots Tracker Pro application software on the smartphone incorporates the 
user‘s location, speed, and distance into an integrated interface as shown in Figure 23 below.   
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This technology combines specialized monitoring devices with a smartphone.  The 
environment for this system includes transfer and storage across the Internet.  The information 
stored in the smartphone can also be automatically (or manually) uploaded to a share webspace at 
http://www.sportstracklive.com/  as shown further in Figure 24.  Here we see the speed altitude, 
distance duration, timestamp, and identity of three users.   Detailed information about a user‘s 
exercise experience can be selected and displayed as shown in Figure 25 and Figure 26.  In this 
Internet environment, specific users can also be searched/filtered in the website.   
Personal Note: While this author uses the HxM BT module and SportTrackPro software 
on a DroidX smartphone, I chose not to participate in the live data uploads. 
 
Figure 22.  The HxM™ BT module (device with Zepher written on it) and the Zephyr 
Bioharness for monitoring a person‘s heart rate, speed, and distance. 
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Figure 23.  The SportTrackLive application on an Android smartphone. 
 
 
Figure 24. Live user monitoring data uploaded to shared website 
http://www.sportstracklive.com/ . 
88 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25.  Detailed information from Live user monitoring. 
 
Figure 26.  Detailed location from Live user monitoring. 
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6.7 ICE Medical ID Card 
Like the ICE application discussed above, Memitech offers a USB storage device that 
retains the same information and an application.  The form factor is a plastic card the size and 
thickness of a credit card.  The USB storage flips out of the card and is then inserted into a 
computer USB port as shown in Figure 27 and Figure 28.  The software application launches 
automatically if Autorun feature is enabled, otherwise a user must run the application from the 
storage location.  Once initiated, the software will display PII for the user owner as shown in 
Figure 29. 
Like the ICE application discussed earlier, under normal operating conditions, 
―first responder‖ users do not access PII because the owner user typically controls content 
contained on the device with physical restraint.  However, given the Internet environment, it is 
expected that should the owner user become incapacitated (a user ―failure‖), the first responder 
user will be authorized to retrieve the information, assuming they possess a personal computer.  
Like the ICE application discussed above, once the device is physically distributed to another 
actor, the environment in which it operates automatically expands to any other Technical 
Computer-Based System or additional actors. 
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Figure 27.  ICE Medical ID card.  A USB thumb drive in a credit card format. 
 
Figure 28.  Pop-out the thumb drive and insert into USB port of computer. 
 
Figure 29.  Screen capture of ICE Medical ID application. 
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6.8 Cardio Trainer 
WorkSmart Labs, Inc. offers Cardio Trainer[45] application for the Android smartphone.  
Like the Zephyr Heart Rate Monitor application discussed above, CardioTrainer tracks a user‘s 
location and speed for a variety of exercise activities as shown in Figure 30. 
 
Figure 30. Cardio Trainer application on Android smartphone. 
What makes CardioTrainer unique is that according to its website, ―… was selected as 
the first partner to upload mobile fitness data to the new [Google Health] service.‖  According to 
Google Health website[46], the service provides a solution to help users organize, track, monitor, 
and act on health information.   
The new Google Health is designed to help you keep track of all of your personal health 
and medical information, making it easy to share very specific pieces of information with 
family members and health professionals. The updated design helps you keep your 
profile up-to-date, focusing on current activity and conditions while hiding and saving 
what has happened in the past. All of these changes are available immediately when you 
log into your Google Health account. 
 
Figure 31 depicts user John Smith‘s exercise activity (calories burned over time).  The 
data was uploaded from the Cardio Trainer application on John‘s Android smartphone to 
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WorkSmart Labs website and transferred to John‘s account on the Google Health website.  The 
figure shows John‘s activity over several days.  This Socio-Technical System also uploads 
information to Twitter. 
Google Health offers optional information sharing of this data to other individuals and 
organizations.  By selecting from a directory of ―personal health services‖[47], the PII is 
transferred to organizations‘ web applications.   
When you link a website to your profile, you may authorize that website to read your 
Google Health profile or to automatically send and update information in your profile 
(such as medical records or prescription histories). You decide which permissions to 
grant when you sign up with each website. 
These organizations offer online medical services, pharmaceutical history, lower cost 
medication review, and personal health assessments, to name a few. 
 
Figure 31.  Cardio Trainer exercise activity uploaded and displayed on John Smith‘s 
Google Health website. 
6.9 Electric “Sheep” 
Electric Sheep is an application that runs on the Android smartphone and requires no 
additional external sensors.  Instead, it uses the devices accelerometers to track a user‘s motion 
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while sleeping.  Figure 32 shows a sample sleep pattern collected and displayed on the 
smartphone.  However, the application also collects the user‘s sleeping information and uploads 
the data to Google Analytics.  The application supports by default ―Anonymous usage will be 
uploaded‖ feature. 
This author provided the following inquiry[48] to the developer of the application. 
"Anonymous usage uploaded" concerns me.  What will the data be used for and who will 
have access? 
The developer of the application responded[49] as follows: 
It is uploading to google analytics. Currently only I can see this data. I'm tracking page 
views, so I know what parts of my app is being used, and how often- giving me a general 
idea of how many people are using my app on any given day, etc. Also tracked is your 
calibration result after you use the calibration wizard, along with some information about 
your accelerometer and the hardware name of the phone that is being used. I'm 
considering perhaps going further by tracking ratings and *some* general information 
about sleep movement, but I don't think I would want to go so far as to track anyone's 
whole night- too creepy. 
Let me know if you have any more concerns, 
Jon 
 
Figure 32.  Movement levels detected by Electric Sheep application on Android 
smartphone. 
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6.10 Ultrasound 
Popular Science reported on a new product called the Vscan[50] by General Electric 
Healthcare[51].  It provides a physician with ultrasound information in a very small form about 
the size of a cell phone as shown in Figure 33. 
The VSCAN, ―does everything that a conventional briefcase-size ultrasound computer 
can do. Glide the mini transducer wand over the patient, and it emits ultrasound waves 
that travel through the body. A computer measures the timing and magnitude of the 
return echoes and turns that data into a high-resolution 2-D image.‖ 
Technically, this device is not imbedded or worn by the user.  Therefore, it is not an 
instrument as described in this paper, but it is very close.  Should the manufacturer focus on the 
patient instead of the physician as the user market, it is not unreasonable to visualize patients 
routinely conducting ultrasounds of their own bodies and sending that information to doctors and 
hospitals much in the same way as the H‘andy Sana 210 discussed above. 
It should also be noted that CNET reported the VSCAN, ―--could prove profoundly 
useful, with battery life being the first-gen device's biggest obstacle in the world of mobile 
care.‖[52] One might investigate how information in this device is protected if battery life 
becomes low.   
 
Figure 33. The VSCAN handheld ultrasound. 
  
7 Appendix B: ICD10 
This appendix includes a handful of the International Classification of Diseases, Tenth 
Revision, Clinical Modification (ICD-10-CM)[53].  The R40 series deals with patient coma and 
the R45 deals with patient emotional states.  Below in the list, the R40.222 is highlighted and 
bolded.  It was used as the user impediment in the example application of the IS-RBAC model.  A 
complete version may be found online at http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/icd/icd10cm.htm#10update. 
ICD-10-CM TABULAR LIST of DISEASES and INJURIES 
2011Page 934 
R40.2 
Coma 
Coma NOS 
Unconsciousness NOS 
Code first 
any associated: 
coma in fracture of skull (S02.-) 
coma in intracranial injury (S06.-) 
The appropriate 7th character is to be added to each code from subcategory R40.21-, R40.22-, 
R40.23-: 
0 - unspecified time 
1 - in the field [EMT or ambulance] 
2 - at arrival to emergency department 
3 - at hospital admission 
4 - 24 hours or more after hospital admission 
Note: 
A code from each subcategory is required to complete the coma scale 
These codes are intended primarily for trauma registry and research use but may be utilized by all 
usersof the classification who wish to collect this information 
R40.20 
Unspecified coma 
R40.21 
Coma scale, eyes open 
R40.211 
Coma scale, eyes open, never 
R40.212 
Coma scale, eyes open, to pain 
R40.213 
Coma scale, eyes open, to sound 
R40.214 
Coma scale, eyes open, spontaneous 
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R40.22 
Coma scale, best verbal response 
R40.221 
Coma scale, best verbal response, none 
R40.222 
Coma scale, best verbal response, incomprehensible words 
R40.223 
Coma scale, best verbal response, inappropriate words 
R40.224 
Coma scale, best verbal response, confused conversation 
R40.225 
Coma scale, best verbal response, oriented 
R40.23 
Coma scale, best motor response 
R40.231 
Coma scale, best motor response, none 
R40.232 
Coma scale, best motor response, extension 
R40.233 
Coma scale, best motor response, abnormal 
R40.234 
Coma scale, best motor response, flexion withdrawal 
R40.235 
Coma scale, best motor response, localizes pain 
R40.236 
Coma scale, best motor response, obeys commands 
 
R45 
Symptoms and signs involving emotional state 
R45.0 
Nervousness 
Nervous tension 
R45.1 
Restlessness and agitation 
R45.2 
Unhappiness 
R45.3 
Demoralization and apathy 
Excludes1: 
anhedonia (R45.84) 
R45.4 
Irritability and anger 
R45.5 
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Hostility 
R45.6 
Violent behavior 
R45.7 
State of emotional shock and stress, unspecified 
R45.8 
Other symptoms and signs involving emotional state 
R45.81 
Low self-esteem 
R45.82 
Worries 
R45.83 
Excessive crying of child, adolescent or adult 
Excludes1: 
excessive crying of infant (baby) R68.11 
R45.84 
Anhedonia 
R45.85 
Homicidal and suicidal ideations 
Excludes1: 
suicide attempt (T14.91) 
R45.850 
Homicidal ideations 
R45.851 
Suicidal ideations 
R45.86 
Emotional lability 
R45.87 
Impulsiveness 
R45.89 
Other symptoms and signs involving emotional state 
  
  
8 Appendix C: Siemens Hearing Instruments - Troubleshooting.   
Siemens Hearing Instruments – Troubleshooting[54] 
There are a few common situations new users may face with their hearing Instruments. 
These are generally easy to solve as explained in the table below.  
 
The hearing Instrument does NOT whistle when you hold it in your hand. (Only 
applicable if hearing Instrument does not have an automatic feedback reduction system.) 
Check:Is the hearing Instrument switched on? 
Is the volume control in the right position? 
Is there enough power in the battery? 
Is the earmould blocked with dirt or earwax? 
Have you selected the right listening program? (For example, programs designed 
specifically for telephone use will not allow you to hear any whistling when the 
Instrument is held in the hand.) 
Is the hearing Instrument damaged? 
 
The hearing Instrument whistles while your child is wearing it. 
Check:Is the earmould inserted correctly? 
Is the volume control in the right position? 
Is there any crack in the earmould tubing or ear hook? 
Is there too much earwax in your child's ear canal? 
Is the earmould too small, because of physical changes in the ear canal? 
Is the earmould tubing connected properly to the earmould and the hook? 
Is the hook or tube damaged? 
Is the child leaning against a flat surface, blocking the microphone? (E.g. infant in car 
seat) 
 
The hearing Instrument is dead. 
Check:Is the battery flat? 
Is the battery inserted correctly? 
Is the hearing Instrument turned on? 
Is there any corrosion on the battery or the battery contact area? 
Is the earmould blocked with earwax? 
Is the earmould tubing blocked? 
Are there water droplets in the ear hook? 
 
Your child says the hearing Instrument isn't working properly. 
Check:Is the volume control in the right position? 
Is the opening to the microphone blocked with dirt or dust? 
Is the battery flat? 
Is the earmould blocked with earwax or dirt? 
Is there too much earwax in your child's ear canal? 
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Is the hearing Instrument damaged? 
Are both the hook and the tube dry? 
Connect the stethoset and check if the hearing Instrument still works, and/or if you can 
hear unusual sounds. 
 
The hearing Instrument generates distortion and/or unusual sounds (like crackling). 
Check:Is there corrosion or rust on the battery or inside the battery compartment? 
Is the battery inserted properly in its compartment? 
Is the on-off switch at the correct position? 
Is the volume control in the right position? 
Is the earmould blocked? 
Are there water droplets in the ear hook or earmould tube? 
Is the earmould fitted correctly? 
 
If the hearing Instrument comes into contact with water. 
Steps:Shake the water away quickly. 
Remove the battery. 
Have the hearing Instrument checked by your Hearing Care Professional. If this is not 
possible: use your dry aid kit. 
Leave the hearing Instrument in a dry place. 
Connect the stethoset and check if the hearing Instrument is still working. 
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